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INTRODUCTION 
When the battered women's movement grew out of the broader 
feminist movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s,1 victims 
of domestic violence faced monumental practical and political 
obstacles. No term for intimate abuse existed in the national 
lexicon; virtually no shelters or safe houses devoted to battered 
women had been established; no civil laws had been enacted to deal 
with the emergency aftermath of an abusive incident; and the 
government had a long track record of ignoring the problem or even 
protecting perpetrators.2 
Over the past thirty years, movement activists have focused their 
energies on revolutionizing the terms of the debate, turning 
domestic violence into a widely condemned practice, and trans-
forming the responses of police, prosecutors, and the courts. Their 
efforts resulted in major legal reforms that have substantially 
expanded and improved the justice system's responsiveness to 
victims. 
Given the enormous barriers that once confronted battered 
women-and still confront them today-it is hardly surprising that 
most scholars, policymakers, and activists have been relatively 
unconcerned that most recent reforms have reduced the level of 
procedural justice accorded to batterers. Although no conscious 
strategic decision was made to target batterers' sense of fair and 
respectful treatment by authorities, that is in fact what has 
happened. 
The wisdom of this approach-promoting responsiveness to 
battered women at the expense of providing fair treatment for 
perpetrators-must be questioned in light of an emerging body of 
social science research. Although infrequently raised in discussions 
of criminological theory, social psychologists have developed a rich 
1. As Elizabeth Schneider explains, "The battered women's movement defined battering 
within the larger framework of gender subordination. Domestic violence was linked to 
women's inferior position within the family, discrimination within the workplace, wage 
inequity, lack of educational opportunities, the absence of social supports for mothering, and 
the lack of child care." ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATl'ERED WOMEN &F'El4IN1STLAWMAKING 
23 (2000). 
2. Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the 
Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 9-11 (1999). 
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understanding of the psychology of authority. Researchers eval-
uating why people obey the law have found that the manner in 
which an official directive is reached has an independent, and 
often more powerful, effect than does the outcome of the directive 
itself.3 The likelihood of a person's compliance with the dictates of 
police and probation officers, or with court orders issued in civil or 
criminal cases, is at least as firmly rooted in his perception of fair 
process as in his satisfaction with the ultimate result. 
This idea may seem counterintuitive in a culture steeped in 
deterrence theory, which holds that compliance with the law is 
based predominantly on a self-interested analysis of whether the 
benefits of obedience outweigh the costs.' But procedural justice 
research indicates that the use of fair procedures-allowing a 
person to state their views, ensuring that their perspective is taken 
seriously, and demonstrating that officials maintain an open mind 
about this person and their case-enhances a person's sense that 
authorities are moral and legitimate.5 This perception facilitates a 
person's sense of self-worth and, in turn, his degree of compliance, 
even when this conflicts with immediate self-interest.6 
How has this critical loss of procedural justice occurred? In the 
criminal system, an ever-growing number of jurisdictions have 
adopted a series of discretionless policies, including: mandatory 
arrests, which require police to arrest in domestic violence cases; 
no-drop prosecutions, which require that a criminal case go forward 
regardless of the victim's wishes; and mandatory stay-away orders, 
which require perpetrators to stay away from victims during the 
pendency of a prosecution. These developments, along with other 
system reforms, create a relatively uniform government response, 
but also reduce the ability of state actors to tailor their actions in 
response to individual circumstances. This, in turn, reduces the 
likelihood that defendants will voice their version of events, 
perceive they are being treated with respect, and feel that state 
authorities are attempting to be fair. 
3. See infra notes 142-69 and accompanying text. 
4. See infra notes 140-41 and accompanying text. 
5. See infra notes 142-69 and accompanying text. 
6. See infra notes 142-69 and accompanying text. 
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On the civil side, a recently convened panel of national experts 
drafted the Model State Code on Domestic and Family Violence, 
which recommends extensive expansion of judicial power in protec-
tion order cases.7 The Model Code authorizes short-term, emergency 
protection orders on the basis of second-hand, unsworn accounts 
provided by police officers over the telephone.8 It further authorizes 
permanent protective orders of indefinite duration, in the absence 
of either prior notice to the perpetrator or an ex ante opportunity 
for the accused9 to be heard.10 These provisions would permit a 
highly unusual end-run around long established notions of due 
process in civil cases. 
To date, reformers have sought to prot~ct victims regardless 
of the impact on batterers, and have' paid little attention to the 
potentially close connection between victim safety and abusers' 
sense of fair treatment. But because procedurally flawed policies 
are likely to undermine abuser compliance with official directives, 
a new focus is necessary for victims' long-term protection. Of 
course, treating defendants with neutrality, respect, and con-
sistency is solidly grounded in Anglo-American jurisprudence, 
morality, and decency_ If such treatment also improves compliance, 
however, it is of special importance to intimate partner abuse cases, 
where repetitive, escalating violence is a predictable scenario for 
most victims.ll 
Part I of this Article documents the recent legal reforms imple-
mented on behalf of battered women in the criminal and civiljustice 
systems. These include warrantless arrest, mandatory arrest laws, 
7. See infra notes S0-83 and accompanying text. 
S. See infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text. 
S. The vast majority of domestic violence cases involve male perpetrators and female 
targets. Although cases exist in which the sex roles are reversed, or involve- same-sex 
intimate abuse, I will refer to perpetrators as male and targets as female. 
10. See infra notes 97·98 and accompanying text. 
11. Primarily because relatively few domestic violence activists, academics, and 
policymakers appear to be seriously concerned with procedural fairness for accused 
perpetrators, this Article focuses on the direct impact of such fairness on the victim. In my 
experience of almost twenty years in the movement, I have found that moral and 
philosophical arguments for fairness to batterers typically receive a less-than-warm 
reception. If key individuals are to modify their strategies for addressing the problem of 
intimate partner abuse by increasing procedural justice for batterers, many of them must be 
convinced that such reforms ultimately will promote victim safety. 
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and no-drop prosecution policies, as well as civil protection order 
statutes and statutory modifications recommended by the Model 
State Code on Domestic and Family Violence. Part II describes 
the ways in which these reforms have improved the state's 
responsiveness to victims, yet simultaneously entailed serious costs 
by diminishing batterers' perceptions of procedural justice. Part III 
defines the building blocks of procedural justice and reviews the 
social science data demonstrating its importance for increasing 
batterers' compliance with legal directives. In addition, Part m 
argues this research indicates that those concerned with victim 
safety cannot ignore batterers' perceptions of fairness. The impli-
cations of this idea are explored in Part IV, with suggestions for 
reforms to foster a sense offair process for perpetrators. Police and 
prosecutors must provide defendants with expanded opportunities 
to feel heard and respected, while simultaneously improving 
advocacy services for victims. Defense attorneys must take advan-
tage of their special position of trust to encourage batterers to 
comply with legal dictates. Judges must communicate greater 
respect for and understanding of defendants, particularly in pro se 
contexts. And in civil protection order cases, defendants must 
receive more and better information and must have access to a 
more individually tailored, responsive pretrial negotiation process. 
Finally, Part V explores two cautionary notes to this analysis. First, 
the special characteristics of the batterer population-including 
information-processing deficits that result in misconstrual of social 
stimuli-may distinguish abusers from the other research groups. 
Second, victims themselves also may playa crucial role in batterer 
compliance-a potentially confounding factor to consider in future 
studies. 
Working to improve the conditions abusers face has long been 
considered taboo in the battered women's movement. As one 
example, the 1994 and 2000 federal Violence Against Women Acts 
appropriated millions of dollars for state and local programs to 
reduce domestic violence.12 But in response to activist demands, 
12. Violence Against Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1491 (2000) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13701, 3789p, 3796gg-2); Violence Against Women Act 
of1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of8, 16, 18,28,42 U.S.C. and FED. R. E\TID. 412). 
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both statutes strictly prohibit the expenditure of any monies on 
batterer counseling or other preventive services for perpetrators.13 
This approach to protecting battered women is short-sighted. 
illtimately, the safety of domestic violence victims is directly linked 
to the perceptions and experiences of their intimate partners. 
I. IMPROVING THE STATE'S RESPONSE TO BATTERED WOMEN AT THE 
EXPENSE OF PERPETRATORS' PERCEPTIONS OF PROCEDURAL 
JUSTICE 
As the battered women's movement took shape in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, it rapidly became clear that domestic violence was 
far too serious and widespread to be resolved solely in the private 
realm through shelters, empowerment groups, and community 
education workshops.14 Battering by husbands, ex-husbands, or 
lovers is the single largest cause of injury to women in the United 
States,15 and accounts for thirty-one percent of all murders of 
women.16 Physical aggression occurs in at least one out of four 
marriages, and comparable rates exist among couples who are 
living together~ engaged, or dating.17 Domestic violence is also a 
major contributing factor to other social ills such as child abuse and 
neglect, female alcoholism, drug abuse, mental illness, attempted 
13. Ill. 
14. E.g., SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMENANDMALEVIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES 
OF THE BATl'ERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 29-52 (1982). 
15. Susan A MacManus & Nikki R. Van Hightower, Limits of State Constitutional 
Guarantees: Lessons From Efforts to Implement Domestic Violence Policies, 49 PuB. ADMIN. 
REv. 269, 269 (1989). 
16. BUREAU OF JUSTICE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE STATISTICS (1989). 
17. Irene Hanson Frieze & Angela Browne, Vwlence in Marriage, in 11 CRIME AND 
JUSTICE-A REVIEW OF RESEARCH: FAlfiLYVIOLENCE 163, 177-80 (Lloyd Ohlin & Michael 
Tonry eds., 1989); Jan E. Stets & Murray A Straus, The Marriage License as a Hitting 
License: A Comparison of Assaults in Dating, Cohabiting and Married Couples, in PHYsICAL 
VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN FAlfiLIES: RIsK FACTORS AND ADAPl'ATIONS TO VIOLENCE IN 8,145 
F AlfiLIES 95, 110 (Murray A Straus & Richard J. Gelles eds., 1990) (stating that 161 out of 
1000 couples experienced one or more physical assaults on a partner during 1985 alone); 
Murray A. Straus & Richard J. Gelles, How Violent Are American Families? Estimates from 
the National Family Violence Resurvey and Other Studies, in PHYsICAL VIOLENCE IN 
AMERICANFAlnLIES,supra, at 227, 231-33; David B. Sugarman & Gerald T. Hotaling, Dating 
Violence: Prevalence, Context, and Risk Markers, in VIOLENCE IN DATING RELATIONSHIPS: 
EMERGING SOCIAL ISSUES 3, 6-7 (Maureen A Pirog-Good & Jan E. Stets eds., 1989). 
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suicide, and homelessness.18 But a history of strong opposition 
to-or deep ambivalence about-state intervention in family 
violence cases has long undermined any meaningful government 
response. 
For hundreds of years, the law explicitly endorsed domestic 
violence, upholding a husband's right to physically "chastise" his 
wife. 19 Not until the late nineteenth century did most states begin 
to move away from this position.20 Even then, many continued to 
assert that in the absence of "serious" violence, the government 
18. NAT'!. CTR. FOR STATE LEGISLATURES, TILL VIOLENCE Do Us PART 26 (1993); Jane H. 
Pfouts, Violent Families: Coping Responses of Abused Wiues, 57 CHILD WELFARE 101 (1978). 
19. In the words of the Mississippi Supreme Court, this rule allowed a husband to "use 
salutary restraints in every case of [a wife's) misbehaviour, without being subjected to 
vexatious prosecutions, resulting in the mutual discredit and shame of all parties concerned." 
Bradleyv. State, 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 156,157 (1824); see also State v. Black, 60 N.C. (1 Win.) 
262 (1864) (permitting a husband "to use towards his wife such a degree of force as is 
necessary to control an unruly temper and make her behave herself; and unless some 
permanent injury be inflicted, or there be an excess of violence, or such a degree of cruelty 
as shows that it is inflicted to gratify his own bad passions, the law will not invade the 
domestic forum, or go behind the curtain"); cf. Robbins v. State, 20 Ala. 36, 39 (1852) ("mf 
the husband was at the time ... provoked to this unmanly [assault) by the bad behaviour and 
misconduct of his wife, he should not be visited with the same punishment as if he had 
without provocation wantonly and brutally injured one whom it was his duty to nourish and 
protect."). The first law against wife beating during this period was enacted in Tennessee in 
1850, although it is not known whether this statute was enforced. Elizabeth Pleck, Criminal 
Approaches to Family Violence, 1640·1980, in 11 CRIME AND JUSTICE-A REVIEW OF 
RESEARCH, supra note 17, at 19, 29, 32. In some instances, sporadic periods of social 
awareness concerning domestic violence led to legislative prohibitions in the early 16005, but 
no such laws were passed from 1672 to 1850. [d. at 29. 
20. E.g., Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143, 146-47 (1871) (stating that the privilege to 
chastise one's wife, "ancient though it be, to beat her with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her, 
spit in her face or kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like indignities, is not now 
acknowledged by our law"); Commonwealth v. McAfee, 108 Mass. 458, 461 (1871) (declaring 
that "[b) eating or striking a wife violently ... is not one of the rights conferred on a husband 
by the marriage"); Gorman v. State, 42 Tex. 221, 223 (1875) (noting that a husband's right 
of control over his wife does not extend to punishment and correction, but is limited to 
protection and self-defense). 
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should not interfere in the private realm of the family.21 This view 
predornin ated in most jurisdictions well into the twentieth century. 
Given the long legacy of state protection of and deference to those 
who abuse their intimate partners, it is hardly surprising that 
promoting procedural fairness for batterers was of little interest to 
activists, academics, and policymakers. Instead, these groups 
focused on improving and expanding the justice system's respon-
siveness to victims in need of protection. Although. there was no 
conscious strategic decision to target and reduce batterers' sense 
of fair and respectful treatment by authorities, many of the 
movement's most successful reforms, both individually and taken 
as a whole, have had precisely that impact. 
A. The Move Towards Mandates in the 'Criminal Justice System 
1. The Police: Expanded Misdemeanor Arrest Powers and 
Mandatory Arrest Laws 
Until the 1990s, police officers typically ignored domestic violence 
calls or purposely delayed their response by several hours.22 When 
a complainant called 911 to report that "my boyfriend is mad at me 
and is going to beat me up," she would be told, "Call us again when 
he does."23 Victims who called the police after the perpetrator had 
21. AB late as 1874, the North Carolina Supreme Court stated: "Ifno permanent injury 
has been inflicted, nor malice, cruelty nor dangerous violence shown by the husband, it is 
better to draw the curtain, shut out the public gaze, and leave the parties to forget and 
forgive." State v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 60, 61-62 (1874); see also State v. Buckley, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 
552, 552 (1838) ("We know of no law that will authorize a husband to strike his pregnant wife 
a blow with his fist, such as has been inflicted on this woman .... [A]ny undue or excessive 
battery by a husband ofhis wife either in degree, or with improper means, [is] indictable.") 
(emphasis added); State v. Hussey, 44 N.C. (Busb.) 123 (1852) (ruling a wife's testimony 
against her husband incompetent in all cases of assault and battery, expect where "lasting 
injury or great bodily harm" is either threatened or inflicted); Richards v. Richards, 1 Grant 
389, 392·93 (pa. 1857) (denying a divorce petition on ground that "[i]t is a sickly sensibility 
which holds that a man may not lay hands on his wife, even rudely, if necessary, to prevent 
the commission of some unlawful or criminal purpose ... a man may ... be betrayed into the 
commission of an act, or a harsh expression, for which, in a moment after, he might be 
repentant and sorrowful"). 
22. DEL MARTIN, BA'lTERED WIVES 93 (1976); MURRAY A STRAUSET AL., BEHIND CLOSED 
DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 232·33 (1980). 
23. Elaine Cumming et aI., Policeman as Philosopher, Guide and Friend, 12 Soc. FROB. 
276, 281 (1965). 
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left the scene were commonly advised to "lock the door" or "go stay 
with mother;" no police car would be dispatched.24 When officers did 
respond, they were trained to mediate and to "avoid arrest if 
possible. "25 As one police training bulletin explained: 
The police role in a [domestic] dispute situation is more often 
that of a mediator and peacemaker than enforcer of the law .... 
Normally, officers should adhere to the policy that arrests shall 
be avoided ... but [when] one of the parties demands arrest, you 
should attempt to explain the ramifications of such action (e.g., 
loss of wages, bail procedures, court appearances) and encourage 
the parties to reason with each other.26 
Arrests were rare; studies estimate that they occurred in only 
three to fourteen percent of all intimate partner cases to which 
officers actually responded.27 Battered women were left with little 
or no access to the criminal justice system. 
24. Raymond Parnas, Police Discretion and Diversion of Incidents of Intra.Family 
Violence, 36 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 539, 546 (1971); Raymond I. Parnas, The Police 
Response to the Domestic Disturbance, 1967 WIS. L. REv. 914, 922-24. 
25. MARTIN, supra note 22, at 94 (citing Sue Eisenberg & Patricia Micklow, The 
Assaulted Wife: "Catch 22" Revisited 112 (1974) (unpublished paper, on file with the 
University of Michigan). The Michigan Police Training Academy procedures taught recruits 
to: 
a. Avoid arrest ifpossible. Appeal to their vanity. 
b. Explain the procedure of obtaining a warrant. 
(1) Complainant must sign complaint. 
(2) Must appear in court. 
(3) Consider loss of time. 
(4) Cost of court. 
c. State that your only interest is to prevent a breach of the peace. 
d. Explain that attitudes usually change by court time. 
e. Recommend a postponement. 
(1) Court not in session. 
(2) No judge available. 
f. Don't be too harsh or critical. 
Id. 
26. Id. at 94-95 (quoting CITY OF OAKLAND POLICE SERVS., Techniques of Dispute 
Intervention, in TRAINING BULLETIN III..J, at 2, 3 (1975». 
27. Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, Introduction, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE 
CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE vii, xvi (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 
1992) (citing numerous studies of domestic violence arrest rates). 
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In the mid-1970s, improving police responsiveness became a top 
priority of anti-domestic violence activists.28 Advocates successfully 
promoted reforms that improved responsiveness to victims but 
simultaneously reduced the degree of process previously accorded 
to suspects at a crime scene.29 
First, state legislatures changed the standards governing 
warrantless arrests in domestic violence cases. Traditionally, in the 
absence of a warrant a police officer could .arrest in only two 
situations: (1) where there was probable cause to believe a felony 
had occurred; and (2) where a misdemeanor occurred in the officer's 
presence.30 Because most domestic violence offenses were charged 
as misdemeanors and occurred before the police arrived on the 
scene, timely arrests rarely were possible.31 By 1983, twenty-eight 
states had authorized warrantless arrests if there was probable 
cause to believe a misdemeanor domestic violence offense had 
occurred.32 ' 
This reform effort was fueled in large part by a highly publicized 
study conducted by researchers Lawrence Sherman and Richard 
Berk in 1984.33 Dubbed the Minneapolis Domestic Violence 
Experiment, the study analyzed the impact of arrest on 
recidivism.3' Based on a sample of 314 cases, the study indicated 
28. Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, The Scientific Evidence Is Not Conclusive: Arrest 
IsNoPanacea, in CURRENTCONTROVERSIESONFAMILYVIOLENCE337,341 (RichardJ. Gelles 
& Donileen R. Loseke eds., 1993) (noting that political pressure to increase arrests has come 
primarily from battered women's activists and feminists). 
29.Id. 
30. E.g., ALA. CODE § 15-10-3 (1,988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-06-15 (1989); see also 3 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 5.1(b) 
(3d ed. 1996); Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990, 
83 J. CRIM. L. & CmfiNOLOGY 46, 61 (1992) (stating that this rule applied in most, but not 
all jurisdictions in the mid-1970s); cf. D.C. CODEANN. § 16-1031 (1991) (authorizing arrest 
if the officer has probable cause to believe that an interfamily offense resulted in physical 
injury, or caused, or was intended to cause, reasonable fear of imminent serious physical 
injury or death); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2 (1983) (authorizing arrest when an officer has 
reasonable cause to believe that a crime has been committed). 
31. Arrests are far less likely to be made after law enforcement officials leave the scene 
of a crime. EVE S. BUZAWA& CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRnfiNALJUSTlCE 
RESPONSE, 42, 93-94 (2d eel. 1996). 
32. Zorza, supra note 30, at 62 (citing Lisa Lerman & Franci Livingston, State 
Legislation on Domestic Violence, 6 RESPONSE 4, 5 (1983». 
33. Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest for 
Domestic Assault, 49 AM. SOC. REv. 261 (1984). 
34. Id. 
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that arrest dramatically reduced the risk of re-assault against the 
same victim over a six month follow-up period, as compared with 
alternative police responses of either separating the parties for a 
brief period or "advising" them (a process ranging from doing 
nothing to mediating).35 Sherman and Berk concluded that arrest 
was the most effective means of reducing recidivist intimate part-
ner violence.36 
The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment had a profound 
influence on public policy.37 In 1984, the same year the study's 
results were publicized, the U.S. Attorney General's Task Force on 
Family Violence issued a report recommending arrest as the 
standard response to all cases of misdemeanor domestic assault.3s 
By 1988, a survey conducted by the Victim Services Agency showed 
that only two states, Alabama and West Virginia, continued to 
prohibit warrantless arrest in misdemeanor domestic violence 
cases.39 
Second, in addition to broadening police officers' discretionary 
arrest powers, jurisdictions began to enact laws requiring arrest in 
domestic abuse cases where an officer has probable cause to believe 
the offender has committed an assault, or has placed a victim to 
whom a protection order had been issued in fear of imminent 
serious physical injury. Oregon passed the first mandatory arrest 
statute in 1977,40 and other jurisdictions soon followed suit. By 
35. Six months after the initial police response, official records showed that domestic 
abuse recurred in 10% of arrest cases, 24% of separation cases, and 19% of advice cases. Id. 
at 267. Victim interviews offered a slightly different picture; they reported recidivist abuse 
in 19% of arrest cases, 33% of separation cases, and 37% of advice cases. Id. at 267-68. 
36. Id. at 270 (stating that "an arrest should be made unless there are good, clear reasons 
why an arrest would be counterproductive"). Because researchers were unable to replicate 
the results of this study in six subsequent trials, policy decisions based on these data are now 
subject to significant controversy. See infra text accompanying notes 174-84. 
37. Domestic Violence: Terrorism In the Home: Hearing before the Sen. Subcomm. on 
Children, Family, Drugs, and Alcoholism of the Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 
101st Congo 88-92 (1990) (statement of Eli J. Miletich, Chief of Police, Duluth, Minnesota); 
U.S. ATT'Y GENERAL'S TASKFORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, FINAL REp. 24 & n.17, 104 & n.21 
(1984). 
38. U.S. ATT'Y GENERAL'S TASKFORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, FINAL REp. 17 (1984). 
39. Zorza, supra note 30, at 63 (citing VICTIM SERVICES AGENCY, THE LAw ENFORCEMENT 
RESPONSE TO FAMILYVIOLENCE: ASTATE BY STATE GUIDE TO FAMILYVIOLENCE LEGISLATION 
(1988». Both of these states now permit warrantless arrest. ALA. CODE § 15-10-3 (1995); W. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-1002 (Michie 2001). 
40. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 133.055(2), 133.310(3) (1999). 
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1982, five states had enacted mandatory arrest laws;41 by 1994, 
twenty-one states and the District of Columbia had done the 
same.42 
These reforms created an astonishing reversal in law 
enforcement policy. The long-standing nonintervention protocol was 
replaced with greater arrest powers than in any other category of 
crime, coupled with a strict duty to use that power.43 In the process, 
perpetrators moved from a position of privilege to one in which their 
41. Zorza, supra note 30, at 64 (citing LISA LERMAN, CTR. FOR WOMEN POLICY STUDIES, 
COURT DEClSIONS ON WIFE ABUSE LAW: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 21 (1982». 
42. Presently, the following states mandate arrest when there is probable cause to 
believe that a violation of a protection order has occurred: ALAsKA STAT. § 18.65.530(a)(2) 
(Michie 2000); CAL. PENAL CODE § 836(d) (West Supp. 2001); COLO. REv. STAT. § 14-4-104 
(2000); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.760(2) (Michie 1999); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:79(E) (West 
Supp. 2001); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-509 (1999); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 209A, § 
6 (West 1998); MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 764.15b (West 2000 & Supp. 2001); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 518B.01, subd. 14 (West 1990 & Supp. 2001); Mo. REv. STAT. § 455.085(2) (West 
1997); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33.070(1) (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-
21(a){3) (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-6(C) (Michie 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-
0.7.1-11(1) (1997 & Supp. 2001); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2935.03 (West 1997 & Supp. 2001); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 133.310(3) (1999); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 6113 (West 1991 & Supp. 2001); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 23A-3-2.1(1) (Michie 1998 & Supp. 2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-
611(a)(2) (1996); 'rEx. Cml FROC. CODE ANN. § 14.03(b) (Vernon Supp. 2001); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 30-6-8 (1998); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.31.100{2Xa) (West 1990 & Supp. 2001); W. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 48-5-508 (Michie 2001); WlS. STAT. ANN. § 813.12(7)(b) (West 1994 & Supp. 
2000). 
The following states currently mandate arrest when there is a finding of domestic violence 
regardless of whether a protection order has been violated: ALAsKA STAT. § 18.65.530(a)(1) 
(Michie 2000); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN § 13-3601(B) (West 2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-
38b(a) (West 1995 & Supp. 2001); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1031 (2001); IOWA CODE ANN. § 
236.12(2) (West 2000); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46:2140(1) (West 1999); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 
19-A, § 4012 (West 1998); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 209A, § 6 (West 1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2C:25-21(a)(1) (West 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.03 (West 1997 & Supp. 2001); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 133.310(6) (1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-3-2.1(2) (Michie 1998 & Supp. 
2001); TEx. CmIPROC. CODE ANN. § 14.03(a) (Vernon Supp. 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-8 
(1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.31.100(2)(c) (West Supp. 2001); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-
27-1002 (Michie 2001). 
43. Of course, changes in policy do not always translate into changes in practice. Many 
officers resented their loss of discretion through mandatory arrest laws. One common law 
enforcement response to this loss was "dual arrest." Officers responding to a scene where 
both parties have sustained injuries fail to discriminate between those inflicted offensively 
and those inflicted defensively. Although the latter typically constitute evidence of self-
defense, rather than a criminal act, the officers simply arrest both parties. This tactic 
directly undermines the intent of the mandatory arrest statutes. Donna M. Welch, 
Mandatory Arrest of Domestic Abusers: Panacea or Perpetuation of the Problem of Abuse?, 
43 DEPAUL L. REv. 1133, 1159 (1994). 
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procedural protections were more constricted than those who 
committed crimes against strangers. Those subjected to the new 
arrest policies, in conjunction with their lawyers, denounced the 
reforms as an unfair infringement on their civil liberties. 44 
Although some activists and scholars oppose legislative mandates 
on a variety of grounds, 45 broad support for expanded police powers 
remains strong today. In 1994, the federal Violence Against Women 
Act (VA WA)46 included a provision requiring mandatory arrest or 
pro-arrest policies as a condition for receipt of funding by state and 
local governments.47 This provision remained unchanged in 2000 as 
part of VA WA II.48 Experts in the field continue to cite mandatory 
arrest policies as evidence of the success of the battered women's 
movement.49 
44. See infra text accompanying notes 123-25. 
45. A handful of scholars and activists have voiced opposition to legislative mandates, 
particularly in the criminal justice system, on the ground that they inhibit the system's 
ability to respond to a survivor in the particular context of her individual life. Acookie-cutter, 
one-size-fits-all response to such complex and dangerous situations places a subgroup of 
battered women in substantial psychological and physical danger. E.g., Epstein, supra note 
2, at 18-19; Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State 
Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REv. 550 (l999). Similarly, a persistent minority of battered 
women's activists have opposed mandatory arrest and/or prosecution on victim-safety 
grounds. E.g., CmCAGO METRo. BATl'ERED WOMEN'S NETWORK, POSITION PAPER OPPOSING 
ENACTMENT OF MANDATORY ARREsT LAw IN DOMESTICVIOLENCE CASES 1 (1995) (on file with 
author). 
46. Pub. L. No. 103-322,108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of8, 16, 18,28,42 U.S.C. and FED. R. EvID. 412). 
47. 42 U.S.C. § 3796hh(c}(lXA} (1994) (requiring eligible grantees to certify that their 
laws or official policies "encourage or mandate arrests of domestic violence offenders based 
on probable cause that an offense has been committed"). Battered women's advocates offered 
strong support for this provision. See Domestic Violence: Terrorism In the Home: Hearing 
Before the Sen. Subcomm. on Children, Family, Drugs, and Alcoholism of the Comm. on 
Labor and Human Res., 101st Congo 12-26 (1990); id. at 32-44 (statement of Mary Pat 
Brygger, Nafl Woman Abuse Prevention Project) (statement of Sarah M. Buel, Harvard 
Legal Aid Bureau). 
48. Violence Against WomenActof2000, Pub. L. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1491 (2000) (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13701, 3789p, 3796gg-2). 
49. See generally Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman 
Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 976-77 (1995); Machaela M. Hoctor, 
Comment, Domestic Violence as a Crime Against the State: The Need for Mandatory Arrest 
in California, 85 CAL. L. REv. 643 (1997); Marion Davis, The Rhode Island Coalition Against 
Domestic Violence Celebrates Its 20th Anniversary, PROVIDENCEJ.-BULL., Oct. 10, 1999, at 
lA, available at LEXIS, News Library, Prvjnl File.; Jan Hoffman, When Men Hit Women, 
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 16, 1992, § 6, at 23. 
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2. The Prosecution: No-Drop Policies and Mandatory Criminal 
Stay-Away Legislation 
Increasing arrest rates did not prove to be, by itself, a sufficient 
criminal justice system response. Across the country, prosecutors 
rarely pressed charges in domestic violence cases and, when they 
did, they rarely followed through by bringing the case to trial. 50 
Indeed, they often actively discouraged victims from pursuing relief 
in the criminal justice system. 51 District Attorneys explained that 
"because victims simply do not follow through in domestic violence 
cases, there is no need to waste precious prosecutorial resources on 
them. "52 In addition, domestic violence crimes were notoriously 
undercharged; aN ational Crime Survey found that over one-third 
of misdemeanor partner abuse cases would have been charged as 
felony rapes, robberies, or aggravated assaults if they had been 
committed by strangers. 53 
During the 1980s and 1990s, victim advocates lobbied 
aggressively and successfully to change these policies in many 
jurisdictions.54 Today, many prosecutor's offices in major urban 
centers have adopted aggressive "no-drop" prosecution policies:55 
cases proceed even when a victim recants her original story and 
testifies for the defense.56 In cases where the victim does not wish 
50. Epstein, supra note 2, at 15-16; David A. Ford & Mary Jean Regoli, The Criminal 
Prosecution ofWifeAssaulters: Process, Problems, and Effects, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO WIFE 
AsSAULT: CURRENT TRENDS AND EvALUATION 127, 129-30 (N. Zoe Hilton ed., 1993). 
51. Ford & Regoli, supra note 50, at 130, 141. 
52. Naomi R. Cahn, Innovative Approaches to the Prosecution of Domestic Violence 
Crimes: An Overview, in DOMESTlCVIOLE!'iCE: THE CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 
161, 163 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1992); see also Ford & Regoli, supra note 
50, at 141. One study of domestic abuse cases found that inforty-five percent of the cases the 
primary reason for the failure to go forward was the victim's wishes. Id. at 151. This 
traditional approach is fundamentally flawed, because it is virtually impossible for the 
prosecutor to discern whether the victim is dropping charges of her own free will or with a 
literal or figurative gun to her head. 
53. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 31, at 56. 
54. In a recent survey, sixty-six percent of prosecutor's offices in major urban centers 
reported that they had adopted such policies. Donald J. Rebovich, Prosecution Response to 
Domestic Violence: Results of a Survey of Large Jurisdictions, in Do ARRESTS AND 
RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 176, 182-83 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996). 
55. Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope: The Crime and Punishment of Domestic 
Vzolence, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1505, 1520 n.52 (1998). 
56. For an insightful discussion of no -drop prosecution policies, within the framework of 
feminist theory, see Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in 
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to cooperate, prosecuting attorneys pursue alternative litigation 
strategies, treating domestic violence cases as they would 
homicides, where the victim is, by definition, unavailable at trial. 57 
The government relies on evidence such as recorded 911 calls 
containing excited utterances, photographs and hospital records 
documenting injuries, and testimony from police officers who 
responded to the crime scene. 58 These strategies have proven quite 
successful. In Washington, D.C., for example, the U.S. Attorney's 
Office introduces such evidence in every domestic violence case in 
which it is available, and relies on it exclusively half of the time, in 
cases where the victiril declines to testify for the state. 59 The 
conviction rate in both types of cases is identical.60 
Other mandates are becoming popular in domestic violence 
prosecutions as well. For example, several state legislatures now 
require the issuance of a no-contact order as a condition of pretrial 
release in intimate partner abuse cases.61 This requirement is 
triggered regardless of the individual victim's preference or the 
prosecutor's request, and can last for several months or more.62 
B. Proposed Due Process Reductions in the Civil Justice System 
The battered women's movement has accomplished substantial 
reforms in the civil justice system as well. A mere thirty years ago, 
virtually no legislation existed to protect battered women from their 
abusive partners. Today, every state has a civil protection order 
statute, and the vast majority of these authorize the essential relief 
Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1849 (1996). 
57. E.g., Casey G. Gwinn & Anne O'Dell, Stopping the Violence: The Role of the Police 
Officer and the Prosecutor, 20 W. ST. U. L. REv. 297, 300-03 (1993) (describing steps taken 
to prosecute a domestic violence case without the participation of the victim). 
58. ld. Mary E. Asmus et al., Prosecuting Domestic Abuse Cases in Duluth: Developing 
Effective Prosecution Strategies from Understanding the Dynamics of Abusive Relationships, 
15 HAMLINE L. REv. 115, 139-49 (1991); Cahn, supra note 52, at 174. 
59. Telephone Interview with Robert Spagnoletti, Chief, U.S. Attorney's Office, Domestic 
Violence Unit (Sept. 3, 1997). 
60.ld. 
61. E.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 12.30.027 (Michie 2000); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-1001 
(West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAws § 12-29-4(a)(1) (2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 25-10-23 (Michie 
1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.5(1) (1999). But see WIS. STAT. §§ 968.075(5)(c), (6) (1998) 
(building in some victim discretion by allowing her to waive the "stay away" requirement 
within seventy-two hours of an arrest). 
62. See supra note 61 (citing statutes). 
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necessary for battered women to leave an abusive relationship.63 
These statutes provide for emergency ex parte relief,64 no-assault 
and stay-away provisions, temporary child custody, safe visitation 
arrangements for the noncustodial parent, and child support.65 In 
most jurisdictions, these orders remain in effect for one to three 
years66 and may be extended upon a demonstration of continued 
63. Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered 
Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 810, 910-11 
(1993); see also Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARv. 
L. REv. 1498, 1509-14, 1530-33 (1993). 
64. Klein & Orloff, supra note 63, at 1031-43 (stating that alljurisdictions authorize some 
form of emergency ex parte relief upon filing a compl!rlnt for civil protection). Emergency ex 
parte relief provides a victim with court-ordered protection during the potentially volatile 
period between the time of filing a lawsuit and trial. Id. at 1031-34. This is the period when 
the abusive partner typically is served with court papers spelling out the victim's intent to 
leave him-a moment that can set off a particularly severe "separation assault." Martha R. 
Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. 
REv. I, 65-71 (1991); see also Joan Zorza, Recognizing and Protecting the Privacy and 
Confidentiality Needs of Battered Women, 29 FAM. L.Q. 273, 274-75 (1995) (stating that 
domestic violence escalates when a victim leaves or an abuser believes she is going to leave). 
65. The vast majority of jurisdictions authorize the court to award temporary custody. 
Klein & Orloff, supra note 63, at 954 n.968 (citing statutes from forty-two states, the District 
of Columbia, and Puerto Rico); see also N.Y. FAM. CT. A~ § 842 (Consol. 1999); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 16.1-279.1(A)(7) (Michie Supp. 2001). The same is true for visitation. Klein & Orloff, 
supra note 63, at 982 n.1141 (citing statutes from thirty-seven states and the District of 
Columbia); see also ALAsKA. STAT. § 18.66.100(c)(9) (Michie 2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-
279.1(A)(7) (Michie Supp. 2001). Thirty-seven states and Puerto Rico expressly authorize the 
award of child support in a civil protection order case. Klein & Orloff, supra note 63, at 998 
n.1254 (citing statutes from thirty-five states and Puerto Rico); see also N.Y. FAM. CT. A~ 
§ 842 (Conso!. 1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1103(c)(6) (Supp. 2000). 
Rapid resolution of child support issues is critical. One of the primary reasons that victims 
return to their abusive partners is the pressure created by the loss of economic support; for 
a woman with children, a child support award may be the key to freedom. See Martha F. 
Davis & Susan J. Kraham, Protecting Women's Welfare in the Face ofVwlence, 22 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1141, 1155 (1995); Anne L. Ganley, Domestic Violence: The What, Why and Who, 
as Relevant to Civil Court Cases, in THE FAMILY VIOLENCE PREvENTION FuND, DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE IN CIVIL COURT CASES: A NATIONAL MODEL FOR JUDICIAL EDUCATION 19, 44 
(Jacqueline Agtuca et al. eds., 1992); Cris M. Sullivan et al., After the Crisis: A Needs 
Assessment of Women Leaving a Domestic Violence Shelter, 7 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 267, 267-
68 (1992); see also Epstein, supra note 2, at 11 ("[S]imilarly, because the potential for 
renewed violence is greatest during visitation, carefully structured pick up and drop off 
provisions, designed to eliminate victim-perpetrator contact, also can have a significant 
prophylactic effect."). 
66. ALA. CODE § 30-5-7(E)(l), (2) (1998); ALAsKA. STAT. § 18.66.100 (Michie 2001); ARIz. 
REv. STAT. § 13-3602(K) (2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-205(7)(b) (Michie Supp. 2001); CAL. 
FAM. CODE § 6345 (West Supp. 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045(11)(b)(1999); D.C. CODE 
ANN. § 16-1005(d) (2001); HAW. REv. STAT. § 586-5.5(a) (Supp. 2000); IDAHO. CODE § 39-
6311(4) (Michie Supp. 2001); 750 ILL. COMPo STAT. 60/220(b) (1999); IND. CODEANN-. § 34-26-
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need. In addition, most states have adopted enforcement 
mechanisms for protection orders: thirty-eight (and the District of 
Columbia) through criminal contempt laws67 and all fifty through 
statutes criminalizing protection order violations.68 
Despite these successes, serious impediments to judicial imple-
mentation of these laws persist. A lack of information about the 
2-13(2) (Michie 2000); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5(2)(e) (West 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
3107(d) (Supp. 2000); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.750(2) (Michie 1999); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 46:2136(F) (West Supp. 2001); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4007(2) (West 1998); MD. 
CODE ANN., F AM. LAw § 4-506(2)(iii) (Supp. 2001); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 209A, § 3(i) 
(West 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01, Subd. 6(a), (b) (West Supp. 2001); Mo. ANN. STAT. 
§ 455.040(1) (West Supp. 2001); NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42-924(3) (1998); NEV. REV. STAT. § 
33-080 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:5(V1) (Supp. 2001); N.Y. 
FAM. CT. A~ § 842 (Gould 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-3(13)(b) (1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 22, § 60.4(H) (Supp. 2001); OR. REv. STAT. § 107.718(1) (1999); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 6108(d) (West Supp. 2001); R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-15-3(c)(2) (2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-
70(A) (Law. Co-op Supp. 2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 25-10-5 (Michie 1999); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 36-3-608(a) (1996); TEX. FAM. CoDE ANN. § 6.506 85.025(a) (Vernon Supp. 2001); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 16. 1-279. l(B) (Michie Supp. 2001); WASH. REV. CoDE ANN. § 26.50.060(2) (West 
Supp. 2001); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 813.12(4)(3)(c)(1) (West Supp. 2000). 
67. ALA. CODE § 30-5A-6 (1998); ALAsKA STAT. § 9.50.010(5) (Michie 2000); ARIz. REv. 
STAT. § 13-3602(J) (2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-210 (Michie 1998); CAL. PENAL CODE § 
166(c)(1) (West Supp. 2001); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.5(7) (2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, 
§ 1271A (Supp. 2000); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005(g) (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30(8)(a) 
(West Supp. 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-6(a) (1999); HAw. REv. STAT. § 710-1077(1)(g) 
(1993); IDAHO CoDE § 39-6312 (Michie Supp. 2001); 750 Ill. COMPo STAT. 60/223(a) (West 
Supp. 2001); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.8 (West 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3110 (1994); Ky. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.760(1) {Michie 1999); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46:2137 (West Supp. 2001); 
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 4011(2) (West 1998); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-508(1) 
(1999); MICH. COMPo LAws ANN § 600.2950(23) (West 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN § 518B.01, 
subd. 14(f), (g) (Supp. 2001); MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-21-21 (1999); NEV. CT. R. ANN., E.D.C.R. 
5.22(g)(2) (Michie 2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:9(II) (Supp. 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
2C:29-9 (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5(B) (Michie Supp. 2001); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 
215.51(b) (Conso!. 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-4(a) (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-06 
(Supp. 2001); OWO REV. CODE ANN. § 2705.02(A) (West Supp. 2000); OR. REV. STAT. § 
107.720(4)(1999); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6114 (West Supp. 2001); R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-15-
3(c) (2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-60(b) (Law. Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-610(a) 
(1996); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.506 (Vernon Supp. 2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1108(e) 
(Supp. 2000); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.50.110(6) (West Supp. 2001); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 
1-28-107 (Michie 2001); Connecticut v. Murray, 623 A.2d 60 (Conn. 1993). 
68. Klein & Orloff, supra note 63, at 1096 n.1835 (citing statutes in forty states and 
Puerto Rico); see also LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:79 (West Supp. 2001); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 19-A, § 4011(1) (West Supp. 2000); MICH. COMPo LAws § 600.2950(22) (West 2000); MIss. 
CODE ANN. § 99-3-7(3) (Supp. 2000); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:5(V1I) (Supp. 2001); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-30 (West 1995); N.Y. CRIM. PRoe. § 140.10(4) (Conso!. 1996 & Supp. 
2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 133.310(3) (1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-10-13 (Michie 1999); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-611(a) (1996). 
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social and psychological dynamics of domestic violence causes 
many judges to become frustrated with petitioners whom they 
perceive as "refusing" to leave the abusive relationship. Operating 
under this misperception, they often find the victim's behavior 
puzzling and enormously frustrating.69 When a woman files a civil 
protection order suit after dropping previous cases, judges have 
made comments such as: "Oh, it's you again;" "How long are you 
going to stay away this time;" or "You want to go back and get beat 
up again?"70 Others have gone so far as to threaten victims with 
sanctions for repeated use of the court system.71 
Judges also may misinterpret victim behavior that is symp-
tomatic of the psychological trauma induced by extended abuse. 
Survivors of prolonged or severe domestic violence often exhibit 
some symptoms or meet the full diagnostic criteria for post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).72 This disorder can result in a 
courtroom presentation that is substantially different from the 
behavior and demeanor that a judge encounters in his normal 
experience; these differences may be misinterpreted as indications 
of a lack of credibility.73 
These complexities can lead judges to identify with the batterer, 
distance themselves from the victim,74 and apply artificially 
heightened standards of proof.75 A judge may refuse to issue civil 
69. The following discussion of judicial attitudes is based in large part on the fmdings of 
gender bias task force reports published during the period from the late 19805 to the mid-
1990s. These reports typically discuss incidents and behavior patterns observed during the 
preceding five to ten years. It is possible that some improvements have occurred since the 
reports were issued. In my own experience in litigating cases and training judges, however, 
such reactions remain common. 
70. MARYLAND SPEC. J. COm!. ON GENDER BIAS IN THE CTs., REPORT ON GENDER BIAS IN 
THE COURTS, 7-8 (1989) [hereinafter MARYLAND GENDER BIAS TASKFORCE REPORT]. 
71. Id. at 8. A particularly egregious example occurred in North Dakota, where ajudge 
is reported to have told a domestic violence petitioner, "If you go back [to the perpetrator] one 
more time, I'll hit you myself." N.D. COMM'N ON GENDER FAIRNESS, A DIFFERENCE IN 
PERCEPl'IONS: THE FINALREPORTONTHENORTH DAKOTA COmnSSION ON GENDER FAIRNESS 
IN THE COURTS, reprinted in 72 N.D. L. REV. 1113, 1208 (1996) .. 
72. Epstein, supra note 2, at 40. 
73. For a detailed discussion ofPTSD symptoms and their impact on judges see id. at 40-
43. 
74. Hanna, supra note 56, at 1878. 
75. Kit Kinports & Karla Fischer, Orders of Protection in Domestic Violence Cases: An 
Empirical Assessment of the Impact of the Reform Statutes, 2 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 163, 199-
205 (1993). 
HeinOnline -- 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1862 2001-2002
1862 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1843 
protection orders when documentary or other physical evidence is 
absent; 76 when unbiased eyewitnesses are not available; 77 when 
the only witnesses are the parties and, therefore, a credibility 
determination is required; 78 or when the victim has failed to follow 
through with a protection order case on a prior occasion.79 These 
kinds of standards have no basis in law and are not applied in other 
family law cases. 
In 1994, in an effort to address these and other concerns, the 
National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges convened an 
expert advisory committee to draft the Model Code on Domestic and 
Family Violence.8o The purpose of the Code is to "help protect 
victims in a fair, prompt and comprehensive fashion. It will help 
prevent future violence in every family where such violence has 
been discovered. »81 
But in pursuit of this goal, the Model Code recommends nu-
merous modifications of existing state protection order legislation, 
some of which would substantially reduce the process accorded to 
batterers. Its drafters urge states to adopt its provisions;82 and 
76. See id. at 200·01: see also CONN. TASK FORCE ON GENDER, JUSTICE & THE CTS., 
REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE 103-04 (1991) (reporting that half of Connecticut judges 
require evidence of physical injury before issuing a protection order and describing an 
incident in which a judge observed the petitioner's injuries, told her he had received worse 
bruises playing golf, and denied her petition); MARYLAND GENDER BIAS TASKFoRCE REPORT, 
supra note 70, at 4 (reporting an instance in which judge told petitioner to "go back and get 
beaten up and have bruises" to qualify for court protection). The Minnesota Supreme Court 
Task Force for Gender Fairness in the Courts reported an incident in which a judge told a 
petitioner to "provoke a more serious incident in order to make sure her case was strong 
enough to support" a protection order. MINN. SUP. CT. TASKFORCE FORGENDERFAlRNESS IN 
THECTS., FINAL REPORT (1989), reprinted in 15 WM. MlTCHELLL. REV. 825, 875 (1989). When 
the petitioner said, "I guess I need a knife in my back or at least to be bleeding profusely 
from the head and shoulders to get [a protection order)," the judge responded, "That's just 
about it." 
77. Kinports & Fischer, supra note 75, at 201-02. 
78. [d. at 202. 
79. [d. 
80. MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAM. VIOLENCE (Nat'! Council of Juv. & Fam. Ct. 
Judges 1994) [hereinafter MODEL CODE). The Introduction to the Model Code states that the 
Committee was comprised of leaders in the domestic violence field, including judges, 
prosecutors, defense attorneys, matrimonial lawyers, battered women's advocates, medical 
and health care professionals, law enforcement personnel, legislators, educators, and others. 
[d. atv. 
81. [d. at vi. 
82. [d. 
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although some of its proposals have had a primarily symbolic 
impact, several jurisdictions have enacted some Code-inspired 
legislation and others are considering doing the same.83 Two major 
Code provisions are discussed below: first, the authorization of 
short-term, emergency protection orders issued on the basis of 
second-hand, unsworn telephonic accounts provided by police 
officers; second, permanent protection orders, of indefinite duration, 
issued in the absence of either prior notice to the perpetrator or an 
ex ante opportunity to be heard. 
1. Emergency Protection Orders Issued Solely on the Basis of 
Police Statements 
In an effort to maxnmze victim safety in the immediate 
aftermath of a violent incident, the Model Code gives a judge 
authority to grant a seventy-two hour, ex parte emergency' pro-
tection order on the basis of a law enforcement officer's statements, 
given over the telephone or in person.84 The judge must determine 
that there are "reasonable grounds to believe" that the victim is 
in immediate danger based on a recent incident of violence or 
threats.55 That assessment may be based on an officer's unsworn 
comments made out of the judge's presence, so there is no 
opportunity for the court to assess the officer's demeanor and 
degree of credibility. 86 Nor is there an opportunity for the judge to 
make any assessment about the petitioner's credibility; she is not 
required to testify, either in person or on the telephone.87 The 
resulting order may direct the accused perpetrator to temporarily 
do any of the following: stay away from and not contact the 
petitioner; vacate the petitioner's residence, even if the accused 
is the sole owner of the property; give the petitioner possession 
and use of an automobile-again, regardless of ownership; and 
83. For example, the author sits on the District of Columbia Domestic Violence 
Coordinating Council's Legislation Subcommittee, which has conducted an extensive review 
of the Model Code to assess whether to propose an adapted version for enactment by the D.C. 
City Council. 
84. MODEL CODE §§ 305(1), (5). 
85. [d. §§ 305(1), 102(1). 
86. See id. § 305(1). 
87. [d. 
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surrender custody of any minor children to the petitioner.88 
Provisions similar to these have been enacted in Alaska, 89 Arizona,90 
California,91 Massachusetts,92 and Virginia.93 
2. Permanent Ex Parte Protection Orders 
Traditionally, courts have authority to issue long-term in-
junctions only after a trial or documented defense default. The 
Model Code, however, sacrifices these procedural conventions in 
deference to victim safety. Pursuant to the Code, "[i]f it appears 
from a petition" that domestic violence has occurred, a judge may, 
"[wlithout notice or hearing, immediately issue an order for 
protection" on an ex parte basis.94 Not only would the respondent be 
denied an opportunity to state his case, but the petitioner could rely 
on the strength of her written pleading and would not need to 
convince the judge of her credibility in person. 
In addition, the Model Code would further alter the laws of most 
states by making protection orders permanent. Where in most 
jurisdictions protection orders may last from one to three years ,95 
pursuant to the Code a protection order is effective indefinitely, 
or "until further order of the COurt.,,96 A protection order issued 
pursuant to this system of reduced procedural guarantees also 
could contain fairly comprehensive relief. For example, such an 
order may direct a perpetrator to vacate a shared residence, turn 
over possession of an automobile, lose custody of his children, and 
anything additional that a judge "deems necessary to protect and 
provide for the safety of the petitioner. "97 Although the Model Code 
88. Id. § 305(3)(a)-(O. 
89. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.110 (Michie 2000). 
90. ARIZ. REv. STAT. §§ 13-3624(C}-(E) (2000) (such an order may last only until following 
business day). 
91. CAL. F AM. CODE §§ 6250, 6256 (West 1994 & Supp. 2001) (such an order may last only 
seven calendar days or five business days, whichever is less). 
92. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 209A, §§ 4, 5 (West 1998) (such an order may last up to 
ten business days). 
93. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1-253.4(B), (C) (Michie Supp. 2001). The law enforcement 
officer's assertions must be made under oath. Id. § 16.1-253.4(B). 
94. MODEL CODE § 306(1)(a). 
95. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
96. MODEL CODE § 306(5). 
97. Id. § 305(3). 
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does provide an ex post avenue through which a defendant may 
access traditional procedural guarantees,98 such a safeguard pales 
in comparison to a hearing scheduled prior to the issuance of an 
order. 
In sum, the impressive reforms proposed and executed in the 
criminal and civil justice systems have dramatically increased 
the state's responsiveness to victims of domestic violence. But, as 
argued in Part II, these changes have carried with them a sub-
stantial downward shift in the degree of process offered to batterers 
during arrest, charging, and civil or criminal trials. 
II. MANDATED INTERVENTIONS AND EXPANDED JUDICIAL 
AUTHORITY: CAUSE FOR CONCERN 
As discussed above, the battered women's movement has 
substantially improved the state's responsiveness to victims of 
domestic violence. Warrantless arrests and mandatory criminal 
justice interventions have resulted in increased application of 
criminal sanctions. Civil protection order statutes provide injunc-
tive relief tailored to survivors' safety and family law needs. And 
the proposed Model Code certainly would facilitate victims' ability 
to obtain protection orders. But all of this progress has come with 
serious costs, both in the criminal and civil justice systems. 
A Mandatory Criminal Justice Interventions 
In the criminal justice system, mandatory policies represent an 
important symbolic shift; a declaration that the state no longer 
condones violence against women.99 Such policies force officials to 
take domestic violence seriously and protect victims, something 
they had failed to do for centuries. In addition, supporters argue 
that mandatory arrest is the most effective way to protect women 
98. If, within thirty days after the protection order is served, either party requests a 
hearing, the court must hold one. Id. § 307(1). In addition, the court must hold a hearing 
subsequent to the order taking effect, if the order contains relief in the form of an award of 
custody, a directive that respondent not contact petitioner, or a directive that respondent 
vacate petitioner's residence. Id. § 307(2). 
99. Kathleen J. Ferraro & Lucille Pope, Irreconcilable Differences: Battered Women, 
Police, and the Law, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO WIFE AsSAULT, supra note 50, at 96, 98; Ford 
& Regoli, supra note 50, at 128. 
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from recidivist violence,lOo and no-drop prosecution is the most 
effective way to eHrnjnate a perpetrator's ability to escape punish-
ment by threatening victims into dropping charges.lOl 
Those who support criminaljustice mandates further believe that 
they will have a general deterrent effect. In the words of activist 
Lisa Lerman: 
Even if a law enforcement approach fails to result in specific 
deterrence in some cases, enforcement of the law ... sends an 
appropriate message to the community-that domestic violence 
is not acceptable. Specific deterrence of a particular offender is 
not the only goal. When an arrest is made ... other men and 
women in the community may judge their own situations and 
conduct differently .... 102 
Mandatory arrest and prosecution also operate as tools for 
victim empowerment. Eliminating police and prosecutorial discre-
tion relieves the victim of responsibility for decisions to arrest and 
bring charges. Such relief is described as particularly important 
because it occurs at a time when the victim may be too afraid of the 
perpetrator's physical or psychological retaliation to make an 
appropriate decision. 103 
Advocates of no-drop prosecution argue that early data indicate 
that such policies yield substantial positive results. In San Diego, 
for example, officials found that under a traditional policy, levels of 
violence increased when abusers learned that a case would be 
dismissed if the victim refused to cooperate.l04 In 1985, the city 
100. E.g., Evan Stark, Mandatory Arrest ofBatterers: AReply to Its Critics, in Do ARRESTS 
AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK?, supra note 54, at 115, 128-29. This argument stands on 
shaky ground, given the conflicting results of various arrest experiments in the field. See 
infra text accompanying note 114. 
101. Hanna, supra note 56, at1864-65, 1892. But see Gena L. Durham, Note, The Domestic 
Violence Dilemma: How Our Ineffective and Varied Responses Reflect Our Conflicted Views 
of the Problem, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 641, 650-54 (1998) (arguing that no-drop jurisdictions that 
compel victims to testify deter victims from pressing charges and validate jurors' biases 
against them). 
102. Lisa G. Lerman, The Decontextualization of Domestic Violence, 83 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 217, 224-25 (1992); see also Hanna, supra note 56, at 1864-65. 
103. Sarah Mausolff Buel, Mandatory Arrest for Domestic Violence, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S 
L.J. 211, 222-23 (1988); Hanna, supra note 56, at 1865. 
104. Gwinn & O'Dell, supra note 57, at 310. 
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implemented a no-drop policy. Domestic homicides fell from thirty 
in 1985 to twenty in 1990, and to seven in 1994.105 
A growing number of critics, however, have identified problems 
with the invocation of an increasingly potent state response to 
intimate abuse. By failing to honor a victim's individual prefer-
ences, mandatory policies patronize her and may undermine her 
efforts to exert control over her life by disrupting her intimate 
relationship, economic security, and family stability. lOG These 
reforms also are particularly problematic for many victim sub-
groups, in particular racial minorities, 107 jmmjgrant populations ,108 
and those oflower socio-economic status. 109 As Kimberle Crenshaw 
explains: 
Women of color are often reluctant to call the police, a hesitancy 
likely due to a general unwillingness among people of color to 
subject their private lives to the scrutiny and control of a police 
force that is frequently hostile. There is also a more generalized 
community ethic against public intervention, the product of a 
desire to create a private world free from the diverse assaults on 
the public lives of racially subordinated people. The home is not 
simply a man's castle in the patriarchal sense; but may also 
function as a safe haven from the indignities of life in a racist 
society. no 
Women in jmmjgrant communities face laws that make a 
batterer deportable ifhe is convicted of a domestic violence offense, 
stalking, or a protection order violation, even if he has previously 
105. Mark Hansen, New Strategy in Battering Cases, AB.A. J., Aug. 1995, at 14. 
106. E.g., Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 28, at 349-50; Epstein, supra note 2, at 17-18; 
Durham, supra note 101, at 653-54. 
107. E.g.,INST.ONVIOLENCE,INC.,VIOLENCEINTHELlVESOFAFRICANAMERICANWOMEN: 
A Focus GROUP STUDY 18-19 (Beth E. Richie ed., 1996); KimberIe Crenshaw, Mapping the 
Margins: Intersectionaiity, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. 
L. REv. 1241, 1257 (1991); Miriam H. Ruttenberg, A Feminist Critique of Mandatory Arrest: 
An Analysis of Race and Gender in Domestic Violence.Policy, 2 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL 'Y 
& L. 171 (1994). 
108. See generally Tien-LiLoke, Note, Trapped in Domestic Violence: The Impact of United 
States Immigration Laws on Battered Immigrant Women, 6 B.U. PuB. INT. L.J. 589 (1997). 
109. Susan L. Miller, Unintended Side Effects of Pro-Arrest Policies and Their Race and 
Class Implications for Battered Women: A Cautionary Note, 3 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REv. 299 
(1989). 
110. Crenshaw, supra note 107, at 1257. 
HeinOnline -- 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1868 2001-2002
1868 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1843 
obtained lawful permanent resident status.11l Many victims are 
reluctant to expose their partners to the risk of deportation and 
further fear being ostracized from their communities for doing so, 
particularly if the perpetrator might be subjected to political 
persecution if forced to return to his home country.1l2 
Mandatory responses also may place victims in danger. As 
researcher David Regoli puts it, "Notwithstanding 'enormous 
reforms in policies and attitudes that reflect a growing consensus 
on how best to handle family violence,' we know little with certainty 
about what best protects victims."113 The effectiveness of arrest, for 
example, is far from clear. Several replication studies cast serious 
doubt on the results of the original Minneapolis Domestic Violence 
Experiment, and one of its original authors currently supports the 
repeal of mandatory arrest laws.114 These studies, known as the 
Spousal Assault Replication Project (SARP) , produced mixed 
results, with findings ranging from arrest having no effect, to 
having a deterrent effect, to having an escalation effect.115 Further 
111. illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, § 350, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-639 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2». 
112. Loke, supra note 108, at 591-92. 
113. Ford & Regoli, supra note 50, at 149 (quoting Lucy N. Friedman & Minna Shulman, 
Domestic Violence: The Criminal Justice Response, in VICTIMS OF CRIME: PROBLEMS, 
POLICIES, AND PROGRAMS 87, 90 (Arthur J. Lurigio et al. eds., 1990». 
114. Janell D. Schmidt & Lawrence W. Sherman, Does Arrest Deter Domestic Violence?, 
in Do ARREsTs AND REsTRAINING ORDERS WORK?, supra note 54, at 43, 50-52. 
115. Richard A Berk et al., The Differential Deterrent Effect of Arrest in Incidents of 
Domestic Violence: A Bayesian Analysis of Four Field Experiments, 57 AM. SOC. REv. 698 
(1992) (arguing that arrest has different effects on subsequent violence depending on the 
offender's background); Lawrence W. Sherman et al., Crime, Punishment, and Stake in 
Conformity: Legal and Extralegal Control of Domestic Violence, 57 AM. SOc. REv. 680 (1992) 
(arguing that arrest increased recidivism among certain groups and had no overall crime 
reduction effect). For a useful debate about how these results should be interpreted see 
Richard A. Berk, What the Scientific Evidence Shows: On the Average, We Can Do No Better 
Than Arrest, in CURRENT CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 28, at 330-32; 
Joan Zorza, Must We Stop Arresting Batterers?: Analysis and Policy Implications of New 
Police Domestic Violence Studies, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 929 (1994). 
The replication experiments were conducted in Colorado Springs, Omaha, Charlotte, 
Miami, Milwaukee, and Atlanta. Richard A Berk et al.,A Bayesian Analysis of the Colorado 
Springs Spouse Abuse Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 170 (1992); Franklyn W. 
Dunford et al., The Role of Arrest in Domestic Assault: The Omaha Police Experiment, 28 
CRIMINOLOGY 183 (1990); J. David Hirschel & Ira W. Hutchinson, III, Female Spouse Abuse 
and the Police Response: The Charlotte, North Carolina Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 73 (1992); Antony M. Pate & Edwin E. Hamilton, Formal and Informal 
Deterrents to Domestic Violence: The Dade County Spouse Assault Experiment, 57 AM. SOC. 
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data suggest that although arrest may reduce recidivist violence in 
the short term, it may increase it in the long term.U6 And virtually 
no scientific data exist from which to assess whether arrest has a 
general, as opposed to specific, deterrent effect.l17 
A similarly mixed picture exists on the no-drop prosecution front. 
One study showed that twenty-five percent of men arrested 
pursuant to a victim complaint committed repeat violence against 
their partner even before the criminal case was resolved in COurt;118 
another showed a twenty-two percent reassault rate within three 
months of arrest.U9 The only study to directly compare "no-drop" 
and "drop permitted" policies found that recidivist violence was 
least likely in cases where women were permitted to drop but chose 
not to do SO.120 Those victims who did exercise their option to drop 
the case, however, were subjected to higher levels of violence than 
were those in the no-drop condition.121 
Mandatory prosecution also may harm some battered women by 
depriving them of a powerful negotiation tool. One study showed 
that some victims are able to strike a bargain with the perpetrator; 
she will drop the charges if he will stay away from her, pay child 
support, or give her custody of the children.122 
REV. 691 (1992); Lawrence W. Sherman et al., The Variable Effects of Arrest on Criminal 
Careers: The Milwaukee Domestic Violence Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137 
(1992). The sixth National Institute of Justice funded study took place in Atlanta, Georgia; 
no results have been published. For an insightful analysis of the myriad weaknesses of the 
Minneapolis Experiment as a basis for national police policy, see Arnold Binder & James W. 
Meeker, Experiments As Reforms, 16 J. CRIM. JUST. 347 (1988). 
116. Schmidt & Sherman, supra note 114, at 49; see also J. David Hirschel et al., The 
Failure of Arrest to Deter Spous~ Abuse, 29 J. REs. CRIME & DELINQ. 7 (1992) (stating that 
arrest is no more effective than short-term separation of the parties, or issuance of a citation 
to the perpetrator). 
117. Berk, What the Scientific Evidence Shows, supra note 115, at 324. 
118. DavidA. Ford, Preventing and Provoking Wife Battery through Criminal Sanctioning: 
A Look at the Risks, in ABUSED AND BATTERED 191, 198 (Dean D. Knudsen & JoAnnL. Miller 
eds., 1991). 
119. Lisa A. Goodman et al., Predicting Repeat Abuse Among Arrested Batterers: Use of 
the Danger Assessment Scale in the Criminal Justice System, 15 J.lNTERPERS. VIOLENCE 63, 
69-70 (2000). 
120. Ford & Regoli, supra note 50, at 156. 
121.Id. 
122. David A. Ford, Wife Battery and Criminal Justice: A Study of Victim Decision-
Making, 32 FAM. REL. 463, 469 (1983). Other researchers have studied the impact of 
coordinated community interventions on recidivism of abusers. For example, one study found 
that the combined effects of prosecution, probation, and courl-ordered counseling were 
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But there is yet another danger for battered women arising from 
these mandates that has gone virtually unnoticed in the advocacy 
community. As these reforms were enacted and enforced, offenders 
suddenly were held accountable for behavior that long had been 
routinely ignored. The perpetrator population reacted with dis-
belief, quickly followed by claims of unfair, discriminatory treat-
ment. 123 During arrests, pretrial settlement conferences, and trials, 
perpetrators and their counsel frequently voiced their belief that 
the new system had created an anti-male, pro-victim bias, as well 
as a deprivation oftheir civil liberties. 124 This perception, accurate 
or not, may be harmful to victims. 
Defendants in civil protection order and criminal cases frequently 
complain that the "system is against men," and that in responding 
to a "family matter," the police "always arrest the man" and "judges 
always believe the woman. "125 Perpetrators who agree to settle civil 
protection order cases often angrily exclaim that "no one believes 
the man in these cases anyway." Once an order is entered by the 
judge, many of these same men barely wait to exit the courtroom 
doors before crumpling their copy into a ball and slammjng it into 
the nearest trash can, grumbling, "It's just a piece of paper, it's not 
going to change anything." At conferences and trajning sessions, 
defense attorneys frequently echo these sentiments.126 Given states' 
associated with a significant reduction in recidivism. Christopher M. Murphy et al., 
Coordinated Community Interventionfor DomesticAbusers: Intervention System Involvement 
and Criminal Recidivism, 13 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 263, 278 (1998). 
123. This observation is based on numerous interviews with police officers, prosecutors, 
and defense attorneys conducted after the enactment of a mandatory arrest law and the 
implementation of a no-drop prosecution policy in Washington, D.C. 
124. These observations are based on my personal experience, both before and after 
implementation of mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution, negotiating and litigating 
hundreds of domestic violence cases, observing many more civil and criminal cases, and 
directing D.C.'s Emergency Domestic Relations Project, which until November 1996 was 
responsible for handling all pretrial protection order cases for pro se victims in the District 
of Columbia. 
125.Id. 
126. E.g., Sam Skolnik, Domestic Breakdown, LEGAL TIMEs, June 17, 1996, at 14 (quoting 
Colin Dunham, President, D.C. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association). This perspective 
is occasionally voiced in the media as well. Cathy Young, Domestic Violations, 29 REAsON 24 
(1998); RobynE. Blumner,DomesticAbuseLaw TreatsMen Unfairly, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES 
(Fla.), Dec. 5, 1999, at Id; Kathleen Parker, Fathers' Protests Deserve Airing, USA TODAY, 
Nov. 4, 1999, at 19A; Andrew P. McGuire, Esq., Remarks at the D.C. Bar Association 
Conference: The New Rules Governing Proceedings in the D.C. Domestic Violence Unit (Mar. 
21, 2001); Jonathan Rapping, D.C. Public Defender Service Domestic Violence Coordinator, 
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long history of discriminatory refusal to assist victims of family 
abuse,127 however, it is difficult to believe that these new policies 
could have an impact so fundamental as to not only level the 
playing field, but to regrade it in the opposite direction. 
But whether unfair treatment of batterers occurs, or is simply 
perceived to occur, the issue must be taken seriously. Although 
many victim advocates and tough-on-crime policymakers are 
perfectly comfortable with-or at least not particularly troubled 
by-the idea of an antidefense bias, this possibility should be of 
equal concern to victims as it is to perpetrators. As discussed infra, 
recent social science data demonstrate that even unrealistic 
perceptions of unfair treatment undermine subsequent compliance 
with the law. Given the likelihood that a victim will resume some 
form. of contact with her abusive partner in the aftermath of official 
intervention,128 factors affecting future compliance assume major 
significance for victim safety. 
B. Expanded Judicial Authority in Awarding Civil Protection 
Orders 
A similar set of concerns arises on examination of recent reform 
proposals in the civil protection order system. Although the Model 
Code proposals address real problems and would certainly improve 
victims' access to justice, they are accompanied by a dramatic 
erosion of traditional due process guarantees for defendants. 
The measures proposed in the Model Code are designed, in 
part, to maximize victims' ability to obtain protection orders.129 
Studies have shown that many battered women come to court for a 
Remarks at the D.C. Criminal and Appellate Practice Institute (Nov. 20, 1999). 
Attorneys who represent accused perpetrators also see mandatory arrest as a serious 
threat to their clients' civil liberties. Mandatory Arrest Policies in Domestic Violence Cases: 
Hearing before the Subcomm. on Crime and Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 103d Cong. (1994) (statement of the American Civil Liberties Union), available 
at http://www.aclu.orglcongressllg071494z.html. 
127. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text. 
128. Kristin Littel et aI., Assessing Justice System Response to Violence Against Women: 
A Tool for Law Enforcement, Prosecution and the Courts to Use in Developing Effective 
Responses (1998) (information provided in section regarding the response oflaw enforcement 
to violence against women), available at http://www.vaw.umn.eduIPromiselpplaw.htm. 
129. MODEL CODE § 306 cmt. 
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temporary, ex parte protection order, but then never return to 
obtain longer-term protection.1SO Judicial bias, frustration, and the 
tendency to discredit victims,131 as well as fear ofbatterer reprisals, 
create serious obstacles to victims' ability to safely and productively 
access the civil justice system. Petitioners in civil protection order 
cases are frequently frustrated when the police are unable to offer 
them immediate protection at the scene of an abusive incident, and 
they routinely express surprise and dismay when they learn that 
they must notify their abusive partner about the civil protection 
order suit and testify in his presence.132 
The Model Code's emergency process certainly goes a long way 
toward ensuring a victim's access to legal protection until she 
realistically can have time to appear before a judge and provide a 
more formal presentation of her case. At the same time, this process 
may well feel unfair to an accused batterer. It is unlikely that a 
person under arrest will perceive as fair and unbiased a finder of 
fact who relies exclusively on a police officer's version of events, and 
who provides the accused with no opportunity to present his own 
story. The police, perhaps more than any other government actors, 
are not viewed as neutral arbiters by either those in the criminal 
justice system or the general public.1s3 
Similarly, the Model Code's ex post procedural safeguards pale 
in comparison to a hearing that occurs prior to the issuance of an 
order. Few respondents in any jurisdiction are represented by 
counsel in civil protection order cases,134 so they are unlikely to be 
130. NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CML PRoTECTION ORDERS: THE BENEFITS AND 
LIMITATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 47 (Susan L. Keilitz et al. eds., 1997) 
(battered women obtained a temporary protection order but did not return for a permanent 
order in forty-four percent of District of Columbia cases studied, sixty-one percent of Denver 
cases studied, and seventy-five percent of Delaware cases studied); Adele Harrell & Barbara 
Smith, Effects of Restraining Orders on Domestic Violence Victims, in THE URBAN mST., 
LEGAL INTERVENTIONS INFAMILYVIOLENCE: REsEARCH FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
49, 50 (1998). 
131. See supra notes 69-79 and accompanying text. 
132. Even when police conscientiously adhere to mandatory arrest policies, they are of 
little use when the batterer flees the scene before the arrival oflaw enforcement. 
133. FRANKJ. VANDALL, POLICE TRAINING FOR TOUGH CALLS: DrsCRETlONARYSlTUATIONS 
1 & nn.4-6, 2 & n.29 (1976). 
134. District of Columbia study found that approximately seventy percent of petitioners 
and respondents are unrepresented in civil protection order cases. D.C. COURTS, FINAL 
REPORT OF THE TASKFORCE ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC BIAS AND TASKFORCE ON GENDER BIAS 
IN THE COURTS 143 (1992). In general, up to ninety percent of defendants in civil courts 
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advised of their right to request a hearing in the month following 
the receipt of what, on its face, appears to be a final court order. 
Even in those instances where a hearing is scheduled and held, this 
only provides the respondent with an opportunity to undo the order 
long after it has gone into effect. He is likely to spend at least thirty 
days, and most likely far longer, ordered out of his home, forced to 
stay away from a range of persons and places, with no access to his 
children, and without the use of his car.135 
The Code's authors justify their proposals by explaining that: 
" [t]here is evidence that the safety, if not the lives, of victims would 
be jeopardized if they were required to give notice and participate 
in a full hearing before any legal protection is issued. "136 This may 
be true,137 but these suggested reforms also most certainly deprive 
respondents of their traditional due process rights. 
Movement activists, policymakers, and scholars have debated the 
relative merits of criminal and civil justice system reforms almost 
exclusively in terms of expanding victims' access to justice and 
increasing perpetrators' accountability. Little or no concern has 
been expressed about the accompanying reduction in procedural 
protections for perpetrators. Even more significantly, virtually no 
attention has been paid to the data demonstrating a close 
connection between batterers' sense of unfair treatment and victim 
safety. 
Of course, providing defendants with due process isa concept 
firmly rooted in the U.S. Constitution.13s Ensuring that an accused 
person is treated with fairness, respect, and neutrality enhances 
dealing with issues such as landlord-tenant cases are not represented by counsel. Russell 
Engler, Out of Sight and Out of Line: The Need for Regulation of Lawyers' Negotiations with 
Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85 CAL. L. REv. 79, 79, 107 (1997). 
135. This proposal represents a dramatic deviation from traditional notions of due process. 
I am aware of no area of civil litigation in which a party's right to be heard arises only after 
an order is issued. 
136. MODEL CODE § 306 cmt. 
137. This claim, however, seems exaggerated. Presumably, a judge could issue a short-
term, two- to three-week ex parte order that would extend from the time of filing the claim 
to the time of a contested trial. This would provide the petitioner with the same protection 
as a permanent order, but also would ensure an opportunity for a traditional hearing with 
routine procedural guarantees. Indeed, this is the process in place in numerous jurisdictions. 
E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1004(d) (2000) (two-week temporary order available on ex parte 
basis). 
138. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1. 
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the morality and decency of our justice system. But if such 
treatment has the additional benefit of increasing compliance 
with the law, it is of particular importance in domestic violence 
cases. For victims of intimate partner abuse, recidivist violence, 
increasing both in frequency and severity, is a highly predictable 
fact of life. 139 To effectively break this cycle of violence, the justice 
system is forced to ensure compliance with its directives. The 
research demonstrating the impact of procedural justice on future 
compliance is explored in the following section. 
III. THE IMPACT OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE DEPRIVATIONS: 
RETHINKING STRATEGIC APPROACHES TO PROTECTING BATTERED 
WOMEN 
Over the past thirty years, activists in the battered women's 
movement have focused on improving the justice system's response 
to domestic violence and encouraging victims to seek help from 
police, prosecutors, andjudges. These responses, however, can only 
be effective ifbatterers actually comply with police directives, with 
judicial orders setting conditions for pretrial release, sentencing, 
probation, and parole, and with court-issued civil protection orders. 
If government power is expanded in a way that instills a sense of 
unfair treatment among perpetrators, it will undermine the 
likelihood of such compliance, and victims of abuse will have gained 
little. 
Recent social science research has shed new light on the factors 
that influence individual compliance with the dictates of govern-
ment authorities. This research represents a significant break with 
traditional criminological theory about why people obey the law. 
Much of the existing research on the effectiveness of justice 
system intervention is rooted in deterrence theory. This theory rests 
on the instrumental view that compliance with the law is primarily 
determined by self-interest. Simply put, a person obeys the law 
when the benefits of compliance outweigh the costS.140 The pre-
occupation of legal scholars with deterrence theory has led to a 
139. ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATl'ERED WOMEN KILL 68-69 (1987); LENORE E. WALKER, 
THE BATl'ERED WOMAN 43-44 (1979). 
140. E.g., TOMR. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw 3-4 (1990). 
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research emphasis on comparing the degree of social control 
imposed through different outcomes of legal proceedings. The 
expectation is that as a negative outcome, or sanction, increases in 
severity or certainty, so does its effectiveness in inhibiting future 
illegal behavior. In essence, "what people care about when they 
have contact with legal authorities is securing a favorable outcome 
for themselves. "141 
But research in the field of social psychology now casts doubt on 
this theory. A growing body of data indicates that compliance with 
official directives depends as much on the manner in which an 
outcome is reached as the ultimate outcome itself.142 Because 
deterrence theory has become so culturally ingrained, this idea may 
seem counterintuitive. Why would a person he more likely to comply 
with an order that he believes is decided wrongly, simply because 
the process that led to it appears fair? 
Some researchers have posited that fair procedures foster 
compliance because of a link to traditional deterrence theory. Fair 
procedures promote fair outcomes; the favorable outcomes, in turn, 
increase compliance.143 
The data, however, support an alternative concept: fair treatment 
affects compliance regardless of whether the ultimate result is 
viewed as right or wrong. If people feel unfairly treated by a 
government official or a court proceeding, they will perceive the 
source as less legitimate and, as a consequence, obey its orders less 
frequently.144 As researcher Tom Tyler explains: 
141. Raymond Paternoster et al., Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Effect of Procedural 
Justice on Spouse Assault, 31 LAw & Soc'y REv. 163, 167 (1997). 
142. TYLER, supra note 140. 
143. JOHN THmAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ANALYSIS (1975); John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CAL. L. REV. 
541 (1978). 
144. TYLER, supra note 140, at 108; Tom R. Tyler & E. Allen Lind, A Relational Model of 
Authority in Groups, 25 ADVANCES IN ExPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 115 (1992). In Tyler's 
words: 
[P]rocedure reflects the diverse values of distributive justice found in such a 
pluralistic society as the United States. Because there is no single, commonly 
accepted set of moral values against which to judge the fairness of outcomes or 
policies, such evaluations are difficult to make. People can however agree on 
the fairness of procedures for decision making. [Individuals'] [e) valuations of 
authorities, institutions, and policies therefore focus on the procedures by which 
they function, rather than on evaluations of their decisions or policies. If the 
consensus that binds together society is in fact a procedural consensus, then 
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[P]eople want to be treated fairly by authorities independent of 
any effect on favorable outcomes. [A]dhering to fair procedures 
will cement persons' ties to the social order because it treats 
them with dignity and worth and certifies their full and valued 
membership in the group. [B]eing treated fairly by authorities, 
even while being sanctioned by them, influences both a person's 
view of the legitimacy of group authority and ultimately that 
person's obedience to group norms. 145 
Accordingly, the procedural justice theory holds that allowing a 
person to state his case, taking his opinions seriously, commu-
nicating that officials maintain an open mind about him and his 
case, and treating him with respect, all enhance his perceptions 
that authorities are moral and legitimate. Compliance, even if it is 
counter to one's immediate self-interest, then stems from a sense of 
duty or morality. 
Researchers have identified several building blocks of procedural 
justice. The first is trust: To what extent does a defendant 
perceive that he has had a genuine opportunity to state his case 
and that his needs are being treated as a matter of concern?146 
This factor is referred to in the literature as "process control, "147 or 
authorities need to be especially concerned with maintaining fair procedures for 
making allocations and resolving disputes. 
TYLER, supra note 140, at 109 (citations omitted). 
145. TYLER, supra note 140, at 165. 
146. TYLER, supra note 140, at 136-38, 163. The importance of this concept has long been 
recognized by authorities. An Egyptian judge's manual written around 2300-2150 B.C. 
advises: 
!fyou are a man who leads 
Listen calmly to the speech of one who pleads; 
Don't stop him from purging his body 
Of that which he planned to tell. 
A man in distress wants to pour out his heart 
More than that his case be won. 
About him who stops a plea 
One asks "Why does he reject it?" 
Not all one pleads for can be granted, 
But a good hearing soothes the heart. 
Id. at 148 (quoting Ptahhotep, The Instruction of Ptahhotep (Egypt 2300-2150 B.C.), quoted 
in JERRYL. MAsHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE at vii (1985». 
147. Tom R. Tyler et al., Influence of Voice on Satisfaction With Leaders: Exploring the 
Meaning of Process Control, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 72, 72 (1985). "Process 
HeinOnline -- 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1877 2001-2002
2002] PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 1877 
"voice."l48 Another building block is neutrality: Is the relevant legal 
authority honest, engaged in fact-based decision making, and 
functioning in the absence of bias or prejudice?149 A third element 
is consistency: Are authorities treating similarly situated persons 
in a similar manner?150 Can an individual expect to receive similar 
treatment over time, in different encounters with the justice 
system?151 The final element can be expressed as standing, or 
dignity: Are authorities engaging in respectful and ethical 
treatment of individuals?152 
The procedural justice hypothesis-that fair treatment by 
authorities improves compliance with their directives-is supported 
by several strands of criminological theory. John Braithwaite's 
shaming theory holds that sanctions imposed in a manner that 
harms a person's dignity may result in an increase in future 
offending.153 Conversely, sanctions imposed in a respectful manner 
that honors human dignity may increase compliance with 
authority.154 Robert Agnew's "strain" theory rests on the concept 
that fair and respectful treatment by legal authorities, which 
entails the opportunity for meaningful participation in the decision-
making process, may reduce the negative feelings that can result in 
strain and rule-breaking.155 Social control theory posits that bonds 
to conventional institutions and individuals curb illegal actions. 156 
control," or the opportunity to express one's views about how a decision should be made, is 
distinguished from "decision control," or actual influence over the nature of a decision. Id. 
148. ALBERTD. HIRSCHMAN,ExIT, VorCE,AND LOYALTY: REsPONSES TO DECLINE INFmMs, 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). 
149. Paternoster et al., supra note 141, at 168. 
150. TYLER, supra note 140, at 118-19, 135. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 138-39, 152. 
153. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 98-107 (1989); see also 
Lawrence W. Sherman, Defiance, Deterrence, and Irrelevance: A Theory of the Criminal 
Sanction, 30 J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 445 (1993) (articulating similar "defiance" theory 
of fair treatment and deterrence). For an introduction to recent debates on the 
appropriateness of shaming see Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 
U. CHI. L. REv. 591 (1996); Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 
89 MICH. L. REv. 1880 (1991); James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame 
Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055 (1998). 
154. E.g., BRAITHWAITE, supra note 153, at 55. 
155. Robert Agnew, Foundation for a General Strain Theory of Crime and Delinquency, 
30 CRThfiNOLOGY 47 (1992). 
156. E.g., TRA V1S HIRSCHI, CAUSES OF DELINQUENCY 10-11 (1969); RoBERT J. SAMPSON & 
JOHNH.LAUB, CRThIEINTHEMAKING: PATHWAYS AND TuRNING POINTS THROUGH LIFE 139-78 
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Perceptions of unfair treatment could weaken one's stake in 
conformity; fair treatment could strengthen it. 
In addition to this theoretical grounding, extensive data, obtained 
in a wide variety of contexts, supports one essential component of 
the procedural justice theory. A strong link exists between one's 
perceptions of fair treatment and one's attitude toward authority. 
Perceptions offairness affect both one's degree of satisfaction with 
the ultimate outcome of a legal proceeding and one's sense of the 
overaIllegitimacy of governmental authority. 
Particular attention has been paid to the importance of providing 
a litigant with the opportunity to state his case.157 The data indicate 
that the simple opportunity to express oneself has value and 
impact-regardless of any influence on decisional outcomes. lGS One 
study demonstrated that even when litigants were permitted to 
speak only after a decision was made (without any possible 
influence on outcome), this opportunity increased perceptions that 
the ex ante decision was a fair one. 159 
Other aspects of fair treatment also affect citizens' satisfaction 
with their justice system encounters. In an extensive study of 
interactions with the police and courts, people reported viewing 
their experience more favorably, and viewing police and court 
officials as more legitimate, when they were permitted to present 
their case, perceived that authority figures were attempting to be 
fair, and believed authority figures were treating them with 
(1993); Daniel S. Nagin & Raymond Paternoster, On the Relationship of Past to Future 
Participation in Delinquency, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 163 (1991). 
157. Thibaut and Walker call this "process control;" Hirschman and Folger call it "giving 
voice." HIRSCHMAN, supra note 148; THmAUT & WALKER, supra note 143; Robert Folger, 
Distributive and Procedural Justice: Combined Impact of "Voice" and Improvement on 
Experienced Inequity, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 108 (1977); see also Tom R. Tyler, 
The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures: Implications for Civil Commitment 
Hearings, in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEy 3, 10 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 
1996) (discussing the value in presenting arguments to a third party). 
158. Tyler et al., supra note 147, at 79 (explaining that perceived control over opportunity 
to speak heightened judgments of procedural justice regardless of perceived control over 
decisional outcome). 
159. E. Allan Lind et al., Voice, Control, and Procedural Justice: Instrumental and 
Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 952, 
952-53 (1990). Another study found that the amount of time spent with an attorney (and thus 
the degree of voice in the process) was positively related to felony defendants' reports of 
procedural fairness. Jonathan D. Casper et al., Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 LAw 
& Soc'Y REv. 483, 498 (1988). 
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respect.160 In another study, the way police officers treated a person 
during an arrest-whether they acted in a businesslike manner, 
tried to be helpful, used disrespectful language, pushed the person 
around unnecessarily, or embarrassed him in front of others-
affected felony defendants' sense of procedural fairness. The quality 
of police treatment also had a spillover effect onto defendant 
evaluations of their experience with courtroom personnel and their 
general sense of fair treatment by the government.161 
These findings are equally applicable to the civil justice system. 
A survey of parties involved in mediated and litigated custody 
disputes revealed that, overall, perceived procedural justice had an 
equally strong impact on outcome satisfaction as did a favorable 
substantive resolution. 162 And for those in "high conflict" parenting 
relationships/63 procedural fairness was more important than 
outcome in detennjnjng outcome satisfaction.l64 Similarly, fair 
process led to outcome satisfaction in two studies of litigants in 
federal civil arbitration programs.165 
Several studies also have shown that procedural fairness can 
have an impact that is not only independent of, but greater than, 
case outcome. For example, a study of defendants in misdemeanor 
and traffic courts found that perceptions of judicial fairness directly 
influenced participants' self-reported support for the legitimacy of 
the individual judge, the particular case result, and the court 
system in general.166 The actual case outcome-guilty or not 
160. TYLER, supra note 140, at 85-93. 
161. Casper et al., supra note 159, at 498, 506. Voice matters to victims, as well. Women's 
satisfaction with police response to domestic violence incidents is highest when the officers 
comply with the woman's preference, whether that is to arrest, or to refrain from arresting, 
the perpetrator. Edna Erez & Joanne Belknap, In Their Own Words: Battered Women's 
Assessment of the Criminal Processing System's Responses, 13 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 251 
(1998). 
162. Katherine M. KitzmaDD & Robert E. Emery, Procedural Justice and Parents' 
Satisfaction in a Field Study of Child Custody Dispute Resolution, 17 LAw & HUM. BEHA V. 
553, 558-59 (1993). 
163. Parents were asked to rate the degree of conflict they experience in twenty-five 
potential problem areas, such as visitation, gifts, and discipline, on a scale of one to four.Id. 
at 558. 
164. Id. at 559-60. 
165. E. Allan Lind et al.,Individual and Corporate Dispute Resolution: Using Procedural 
Fairness as a Decision Heuristic, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 224 (1993). 
166. Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Perceived Injustice in Defendants' Evaluations of Their 
Courtroom Experience, 18 LAw & SOc'Y REv. 51, 67 (1984) (explaining that perceptions of 
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guilty-had far less impact on this sense of support.167 The 
empirical evidence further indicates that people generalize from 
their sense of procedural fairness in a particular justice system 
encounter to broader attitudes about the law, courts, and the 
political system. 168 
A small but growing body of research has begun to make an 
additional, crucial connection: perceptions of procedural justice not 
only increase outcome satisfaction and support for the justice 
system, but actually may translate into future compliance with 
authority. The handful of studies in this area have shown a 
compliance effect in criminal, civil, and family law contexts. 
A telephone survey of people who previously had contact with 
police or courts found that only those who believed they were 
treated unfairly subsequently self-reported reduced compliance 
with laws prohibiting shoplifting, speeding, drunk driving, 
littering, illegal parking, and noise violations.169 Another study 
analyzed factors predictive oflong-term compliance with mediated 
agreements in civil cases.170 Where respondents believed that the 
procedural fairness are linked to defendants' beliefs that a judge takes sufficient time to 
carefully consider a case and that the judge appears unbiased). 
167. [d.; see also Kitzmann & Emery, supra note 162, at 558-60. 
168. Tom R. Tyler et al., Maintaining Allegiance Toward Political Authorities: The Role 
of Prior Attitudes and the Use of Fair Procedures, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 629, 629-52 (1989). 
Procedural fairness has been shown to have a positive effect on participant satisfaction not 
only in formal courtroom settings, but also in the context of alternative dispute resolution. 
E.g., Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court: Achieving 
Compliance Through Consent, 18 LAw & SOc'y REv. 11, 36-37 (1984) (demonstrating that 
compliance with a mediated resolution of a small claims complaint is more likely where 
defendant feels that the procedures were fair). 
169. TYLER, supra note 140, at 40-42. A similar survey found that those who reported 
hearing stories of unfair treatment by the Internal Revenue Service officials in tax audits 
assessed themselves as less likely to comply with tax laws than those who did not report 
hearing such stories. KaryIA. Kinsey, Deterrence and Alienation Effects of IRS Enforcement: 
AnAnalysis ofSuruey Data, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES 259, 267-82 (Joel Slemroded., 1992). 
170. Dean G. Pruitt et al., Long-Term Success in Mediation, 17 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 313, 
324-28 (1993) (explaining that perceptions ofproceduralfaimess were linked to participants' 
beliefs that they were given an opportunity to state their case, that the full spectrum of 
relevant issues were aired, and that the mediators had listed listened to and made genuine 
efforts to understand concerns raised). Complainant reports of improvements in their 
personal relationships with respondents also were linked to cases involving perceived 
procedural fairness. [d. at 326-27. 
Like many others cited in this Article, this study suffers from a weakness common in social 
science research. Researchers were unable to locate approximately half of the original 
participants to obtain long-term follow-up data. Out of a total of seventy-three cases, forty-six 
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mediation process was fair, complainants reported better com-
pliance over the following four to eight months, even in cases where 
respondents were dissatisfied with the substance of the agree-
ment. l71 A study of litigants in small claims court found that 
participants were more likely to comply with both favorable and 
unfavorable judgments when they believed the trial process was 
fair. 172 
This research has particularly important implications for 
domestic violence cases. Advocates for battered women frequently 
express concern that batterers will not comply with court orders, 
particularly in the civil protection context. Manyvictims report that 
their intimate partners have declared that a protection order is 
"just a piece of paper" that will not prevent them from continuing 
their abusive behavior.173 Enhancing the likelihood of a batterer's 
compliance with police directives and court orders could substan-
tially increase victim safety. 
Only one study has tested the procedural justice compliance 
theory in the domestic violence context. In that study, researchers 
considered the extent to which a batterer's perception of police 
officers' procedural fairness at the scene of a reported intimate 
partner crime affected recidivism rates.174 The pre-existing liter-
ature on this subject focused exclusively on the impact of different 
police-imposed sanctions on recidivism (i.e., warning, mediation, 
and arrest); as discussed in Part II.A, supra, the results were 
equivocal. . 
The principal investigators in the original police arrest 
experiment concluded that their study "strongly suggest[ed] that 
the police should use arrest in most domestic violence cases," 
complainants and thirty-four respondents were reached and agreed to participate in a second 
interview. [d. at 317. It is quite conceivable that parties who were not satisfied with the 
mediation, or where subsequent compliance was poor, would be disproportionately 
represented in the group that was more difficult to contact. 
171. [d. at 327. This study's applicability to domestic violence disputes is heightened by 
the fact that virtually all of the cases involved disputes arising out of personal relationships 
and most of those relationships were severely strained when mediation took place. [d. at 316-
17. 
172. McEwen & Maiman, supra note 168. 
173. E.g., JAMES PTACEK, BA'ITERED WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM: THE POWER OF JUDICIAL 
RESPONSES 170 (1999); see also supra text accompanying notes 125-26. 
174. Paternoster et al., supra note 141, at 163. 
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because arrest was most highly correlated with low recidivism 
rates. l75 But when six replication studies were conducted in 
different jurisdictions, the findings ranged allover the map; in some 
studies arrest had no effect, in others it had a deterrent effect, and 
in others it escalated subsequent violence. l76 Even within the same 
jurisdiction, the impact of arrest often varied based on the length 
of detention subsequent to arrest, as well as certain offender 
characteristics, such as employment status and other ties to the 
community.l77 
What these studies failed to consider, however, was the 
possibility that these seemingly inconsistent results could be 
explained through the impact of differing police procedures. In 
1997, researchers re-examjned the data from one of the original 
study sites, to determine whether "the manner in which sanctions 
are imposed has an independent and more powerful effect on spouse 
assault than the sanction outcome itself."l7s 
The researchers analyzed a wide range of data reflective of 
perceptions of procedural justice. For example, arrestees were 
asked whether police officers took the time to listen to their side of 
the story (relevant to voice); whether they expected to be arrested 
when the police arrived (relevant to consistency); whether the police 
listened to both their story and the victim's story (relevant to 
neutrality); and whether they were handcuffed and, in particular, 
whether this occurred in front of the victim {relevant to dignity).l79 
The results of this re-analysis demonstrate that a batterer's 
perceptions of fair treatment have a statistically significant effect 
on his future recidivism.lso Arrestees showed lower recidivism rates 
175. LAWRENCEW. SHERMAN & RICHARD A. BERK, THEMlNNEAPoLIsDoMESTICVIOLENCE 
ExPERIMENT 2 (1984). 
176. LAWRENCEW. SHERMAN, POLICING DoMESTIC VIOLENCE: ExPERlMENTsANDDILEMMAS 
125-53 (1992). 
177. [d. 
178. Paternoster et al., supra note 141, at 165. 
179. [d. at 175-79. Other variables also were considered, including the arrestee's stake in 
the community (including whether he was a member of a church or community organization) 
and his beliefs about the appropriateness of using physical violence against a partner. [d. at 
178. Because this study was based on an after-the-fact analysis, researchers were limited to 
procedural justice data points collected in the original study. [d. at 175-79. Further research 
that includes a more comprehensive range of data points specifically designed to test 
procedural justice hypotheses clearly is needed. 
180. [d. at 194. Because this study was a re-analysis of the data collected in the original 
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when they perceived that they were treated fairly.181 Indeed, fair 
treatment during arrest had the same recidivism-inhibiting effect 
as did a favorable outcome-being warned. When coupled with 
perceived unfair treatment, in contrast, arrest had a significantly 
reduced effect on future compliance. 182 
Researchers further found that neither an arrestee's stake in 
conformity (as measured by marital and employment status), nor 
the length of his post-arrest detention were statistically related to 
future compliance.183 Moreover, the "effect of perceived procedural 
justice is comparable in magnitude to the various effects of arrest 
and stakes in conformity-the two variables which have been the 
subject of much research and speculation in the SARP spouse 
assault experiments. "184 
One other study lends some indirect support to this finding that 
the manner in which batterers feel they are treated affects victim 
safety in domestic violence cases. Researchers asked perpetrators 
to report whether they felt angry ("definitely," "somewhat," or "not 
at all") in reaction to their entry into the criminal justice system. IS5 
Those arrested on the basis of a warrant, who rated themselves as 
"definitely" angry, were three times more likely than those who felt 
less anger to commit repeat violence against their partner before 
the criminal case was resolved in court. ISG 
Minneapolis Experiment, however, the authors concede that it suffers from many of the same 
research weaknesses as did that study.ld. For a review of these problems, see Zorza, supra 
note 115. 
181. Paternoster et al., supra note 141, at 186. 
182. [d. at 192. 
183. Id. at 191-92. As the authors note, however, 
it is entirely possible that our measures of one's "stake in conformity" (marital 
and employment status) are poor proxies for one's commitment to the 
community or group. Future research should employ more subjective 
assessments of the extent to which individuals feel themselves to be integrated 
into and members of the group whose rules are being enforced. 
[d. at 192 n.20. 
184. [d. at 194. 
185. DavidA. Ford,Pre/JentingandPro/Joking Wife Battery through Criminal Sanctioning: 
A Look at the Risks, in ABUSED AND BA'lTERED: SOCIAL AND LEGAL RESPONSES TO FAMILY 
VIOLENCE 191, 194 (Dean D. Knudsen & JoAnn L. Miller eds., 1991). 
186. [d. at 197. In addition, batterers who strongly protest the entry of a protection order 
in the courtroom are three to four times more likely to subsequently violate the order. 
Harrell & Smith, supra note 130, at 49, 50. 
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These studies, in conjunction with the general procedural 
justice literature described above, contain an important lesson for 
architects of the state's response to domestic violence. Even for 
those whose sole concern is victim safety, the impact of reform 
policies on batterer compliance must be taken into account. 
IV. WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE? 
The idea that fair treatment has an independent, substantial 
effect on batterers' compliance with authority is a simple but 
powerful one. Although the justice system's treatment of victims 
has been far worse than its treatment of their abusive partners, the 
perceptions and experiences of abusers can no longer be ignored. A 
strong possibility exists that many well-intentioned reforms have 
undermined victim safety by eroding procedural justice for 
perpetrators. In the criminal justice system, police and prosecutors 
must provide defendants with expanded opportunities for voice, 
while simultaneously improving the advocacy services available to 
victims. Defense attorneys must take advantage of their special 
position of trust to assist in the effort to promote compliance. 
Judges must learn to be more respectful of and attentive to 
defendants, particularly when they appear pro se in civil protection 
order suits. In the civil system, more and better information must 
be provided to accused batterers and pretrial negotiation processes 
must be made more responsive to defendants' individual needs. 
A. The Criminal Justice System 
1. Increasing Perpetrators' Opportunities for Voice 
Many batterers' first encounter with the justice system is the 
moment when police respond to the scene of an abusive incident. 
Perhaps for that reason, perceptions about an officer's actions leave 
a lasting impression and can influence a perpetrator's view of his 
entire criminal justice experience. By creating an atmosphere of 
receptiveness, respect, and impartiality, law enforcement officers 
could greatly enhance batterers' compliance with court directives 
designed to protect victims. 
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To do so, officers must learn to communicate a willingness to 
understand and consider a suspect's version of events. A person is 
most likely to feel "heard" when a listener conveys that he is 
focused and present in the moment; that he is attending to and 
reflecting back what the suspect says without being distracted or 
focused on his own agenda.IS7 The listener also needs to make clear 
that he has suspended judgment and is open to different versions 
of events. ISS Clinical psychologists routinely employ such skills, and 
could develop training programs to help police officers develop 
similar expertise in interpersonal communication. 
Officers also could convey a sense of neutrality and respect by 
clearly explaining their actions, refraining from disrespectful or 
derogatory language, and avoiding the use of unnecessary physical 
force. IS9 Handcuffing suspects should be avoided unless truly 
necessary and then should be accomplished as privately as possible, 
to avoid humiliating the perpetrator in front of his intimate 
partner, family, or community.190 
These recommendations are in no way meant to suggest a return 
to police practices of an earlier era. The gains that have been made 
in sending a clear message of disapproval to batterers and of 
responsiveness and support to victims must be preserved. Police 
must not treat perpetrators more preferentially than victims; 
equally respectful treatment is not only appropriate to the 
situation, it also is the only way to prevent victims from reverting 
to a position of discouragement and distrust. In addition, officers 
must communicate clearly that intimate partner violence is illegal 
and responsibility lies squarely with the perpetrator-hut they 
must do so while treating an individual suspect with dignity. 
On the surface, these reforms might appear to require only minor 
adjustments in the investigation and arrest process. But their 
implementation presents a serious' challenge to the entrenched 
187. E.g., CLARA E. HILL & KAREN M. O'BRIEN, HELPING SKILLS: FACILITATING 
ExPLORATION, INSIGHT, AND ACTION 81-93,99-101 (1999). 
188. E.g., WILLIAM R. MILLER & STEPHEN ROLLNICK, MOTIVATIONAL INTERVIEWING: 
PREPARING PEoPLE TO CHANGE ADDICTIVE BEHAVIOR 55-56 (1991). 
189. See Casper et aI., supra note 159, at 498 (describing research results indicating that 
treatment by police affects a defendant's sense offair process); Paternoster et al., supra note 
141, at 194 (describing research results suggesting that an individual's perception of 
procedural justice reduces his likelihood of recidivism). 
190. See supra note 179. 
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culture of policing. Officers are trained to employ a style of 
"command and control-they try to dominate people and situations 
by displays of force or the potential for the use of force. "191 Most 
officers see their role as apprehending the perpetrator and adducing 
sufficient evidence against him to support a conviction, not creating 
an environment in which a suspect feels heard and understood.192 
They are unlikely to view the task offostering an accused's sense of 
fair treatment as part of their job. 
The challenge here is lessened, however, by the fact that the 
police need not actually feel impartial, they need only appear to be 
doing SO.193 Because compliance depends solely on enhanced 
perceptions of fairness, 194 it would be sufficient for officers to make 
stylistic changes without actually adopting an impartial approach, 
disavowing their adversarial position, or decreasing their legitimate 
efforts to investigate a case. Of cO't;ITse, even such surface-level 
behavioral reforms may be difficult to implement. 
How can police officers be persuaded to create a new culture of 
investigation and arrest? Trajnjng programs need to emphasize 
that, in the long run, these reforms should facilitate the task oflaw 
enforcement, by increasing future compliance with court orders that 
require appearance at trial, set conditions of pretrial release and 
post-conviction probation, and regulate family law issues through 
a protection order. Providing procedural justice reduces "repeat 
customers" -every order complied with, rather than violated, 
means one fewer arrest to be made and in many cases one fewer 
victim re-abused. 
One way to reinforce such trajnjng messages is to provide law 
enforcement officers with feedback on the success of their efforts. In 
191. Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness: A ProactilJe Model of Social Regulation, 
81 B.U. L. REv. 361, 364-65 (2001). 
192. David Lester, Officer Attitudes Toward Police Use of Force, in POLICE VIOLENCE: 
UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE OF FORCE 180 (William A. Geller & Hans 
Tach eds., 1996); Stephen D. Mastrofski et al., Compliance on Demand: The Public'sRespanse 
to Specific Police Requests, 33 J. REs. CRIME & DELlNQ. 269, 274 (1996); Robert Sgambelluri, 
Police Culture, Police Training, andPoliceAdministration: Their Impact on Violence in Police 
Families, in FEDERAL BUREAU OFlNvEsTIGATION, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BY POLICE OFFICERS 
309,314 (Donald D. Sheehan ed., 2000). 
193. Tyler & Lind, supra note 144, at 162. Of course, both form and substance must cohere 
if any claim of system integrity is to be made. 
194. Id. 
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the Manhattan Community Court, the prosecutor's office records 
convictions in a police-accessible database.195 Officers-who previ-
ously had no routine access to such information-report that they 
are encouraged to make arrests when they se.e that their work 
results in a successful prosecution.19S An analogous system should 
be implemented here: as officers learn that suspects they arrested 
have successfully completed probation, or complied with the terms 
of a civil protection order, they may become convinced that it is 
worthwhile to conduct arrests in a procedurally fair manner. 
Another obstacle to reform is that potential suspects may not be 
particularly receptive to police efforts to appear fair. Some citizens, 
particularly those from communities whose members have long 
been discriminated against and otherwise mistreated by the 
system, may see fair treatment by the police as an inherent 
contradiction in terms.197 
This obstacle may be particularly acute within the framework of 
mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution policies. For example, it 
seems likely that a suspect's sense of dignity would be undermined, 
rather than enhanced, when faced with a uniform government 
response that cannot be tailored to individual variations in 
circumstances. This problem might arise when a suspect is told that 
he must be arrested, regardless of the circumstances surrounding 
his actions, or, similarly, when a defendant learns that an Assistant 
District Attorney "cannot" dismiss the case against him so long as 
it can be proven in court, regardless of the relative merits of 
pursuing the particular prosecution. 
Similarly, when an officer is required to arrest, it may be 
particularly difficult for him to communicate credibly that he is 
willing to listen to the participants' stories and take them 
seriously.19B Under a "should arrest" policy, in contrast, this kind of 
195. Julius Lang, Building Partnerships Between Law Enforcement and the Courts, 
Address to the New York Midtown Community Court Community Policing Focus Group 
(Mar. 14, 1997). 
196. Id. 
197. Most people believe that, "in addition to performing ..• varied and valuable social 
functions, [police officers) sometimes abuse their authority: they can enforce law in a 
discriminatory fashion; they can harass and be unduly brutal; they can be corrupted and 
become confederates of criminals rather than upholders of law." JONATHAN D. CASPER, 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE DEFENDANT'S PERSPECTIVE 37 (1972). 
198. While the simple act of giving voice to one's view-regardless of impact-might 
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listening would be more consistent with the officer's job of deciding 
whether a case is one in which arrest may not be appropriate. A 
shift to a should arrest policy would increase incentives for police 
to truly listen, rather than to do so merely as a hollow gesture made 
in the hope of increasing future compliance. 
The adoption of more flexible, responsive criminal justice policies 
makes sense from the victim's psychological perspective as well. 
Many victims feel deeply ambivalent about their abusive partners. 
A woman may love her partner but also be afraid of him. She may 
want to stop the violence but not want him to go to jail. This 
"fluctuating readiness to consider change" makes an ambivalent 
person extremely sensitive to the way in which she is approached 
by a government official. 199 In the mandatory arrest and prosecution 
context, state officials necessarily emphasize one side of this 
internal conflict. By insisting that she prosecute her partner, they 
frequently push her to focus on the other side of her ambivalence,200 
with the unintended effect of encouraging her connection with the 
batterer. Pro-arrest and pro-prosecution policies, in contrast, build 
in somewhat greater flexibility for holding the victim's ambivalence 
by recognizing the complexity of her situation and thus evoking less 
resistance from her. 
Far more data must be accumulated before one could definitively 
conclude that the procedural justice literature alone supports a 
shift from criminal justice mandates to preferences. 201 And the risks 
inherent in basing social policy on insufficient data are well-
illustrated by the rapid law reform efforts that followed the 
Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment and were implemented 
before the replication studies cast doubt on its results. But given 
enhance satisfaction when the audience is ajudge, whose function is to maintain an unbiased 
neutrality, Lind et al., supra note 159, at 952-53, it might be far less satisfying when the 
audience is a police officer or prosecutor, whose interests are commonly viewed as directly 
contrary to those of the accused. 
199. MILLER & ROLLNICK, supra note 188, at 36. 
200. The role played by ambivalence in a person's motivation to change is explored in 
detail in id. at 157-67. 
201. Indeed, the only study to focus specifically on domestic violence considered only the 
police response. See supra text accompanying notes 174-84. Data obtained in other contexts, 
however, strongly suggests that similar results will arise when researchers investigate the 
impact of prosecutors, judges, and other system actors. See supra text accompanying notes 
151-54. 
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that the advantages gained through obligatory arrest and 
prosecution also may be gleaned from other approaches, which are 
less likely to have a dampening effect on procedural justice for 
perpetrators,202 it is appropriate to begin a dialogue about moving 
away from mandates. 
2. Enhancing Victim Safety by Shifting from Mandates to 
Preferences 
What might be lost in a shift away from mandates? As described 
above, victim advocates have articulated two particularly strong 
arguments in support of mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution. 
First, these policies empower the victim, alleviating her of 
responsibility for criminal justice system intervention. In the 
abuser's presence, the victim lacks the emotional space and physical 
and psychological safety to make a well-considered, self-protective 
decision.203 Second, these policies send a strong symbolic message 
that the state condemns intimate abuse and will protect its 
victims.204 
It may well be possible to provide these advantages to victims 
and simultaneously facilitate the compliance-generating elements 
of procedural justice. A number of recent studies indicate that 
mandating state usurpation of the victim's role is not the only 
answer.205 By offering assistance aimed specifically at the diffi-
culties battered women face, police and prosecutors could help 
victims reach a place where their ability to decide for themselves 
would no longer be comprised. In so doing, the state would reinforce 
the symbolic message sent to the community: we will protect 
victims of domestic violence, both by prosecuting batterers and by 
providing victims with the resources they need to meaningfully 
participate in the journey to safety. 
How can the criminal justice system maximize battered women's 
ability to engage in optimal decision making? Recent research 
202. See infra text accompanying notes 203-16. 
203. See supra text accompanying note 103. 
204. See supra text accompanying note 99. The other argument for mandates-that they 
effectively reduce domestic violence-has received only mixed support from the research 
data. See supra text accompanying notes 114-17. 
205. See infra text accompanying notes 207-19. 
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indicates that one important strategy is to offer victims extensive 
legal and nonlegal advocacy services. Such advocacy includes: 
providing information about and access to a wide range of social 
services; strengthening victims' emotional support network; 
providing information about the civil and criminal justice systems; 
and safety planning.206 
Advocacy services can increase a victim's perceptions of social 
support, improve her mental health, and increase her physical and 
psychological safety. In a recent study, college students were 
trained to provide intensive, nonlegal advocacy services207 to 
battered women leaving a shelter. Advocates helped women access 
community resources such as housing, employment, legal assist-
ance, transportation, child care, health care, and counseling for 
their children.208 After ten weeks, women in the advocacy group 
reported improvements in social support, greater effectiveness in 
obtaining necessary resources, less depression, fear and anxiety, 
and a better quality of life than those in the comparison groUp.209 
Most importantly, these women experienced less physical and 
psychological abuse, and those who wished to end their abusive 
relationships were significantly more effective in doing SO.210 
Such advocacy services can, in turn, increase the degree to which 
victims are willing to cooperate with the criminal justice system. In 
one study, survivors with better access to tangible support were 
approximately twice as likely to voluntarily participate in the 
prosecutions of their intimate partners.211 
Advocates also can reverse a victim's sense of social isolation 
and improve her sense of emotional well-being. Such assistance 
is particularly important for battered women, whose support 
206.Id. 
207. Each woman was assigned a college student volunteer who served as her advocate 
for six hours a week, over ten weeks. Cris M. Sullivan & Deborah I. Bybee,Reducing Violence 
Using Community-Based Advocacy for Women With Abusive Partners, 67 J. CONSULTING& 
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 43, 45 (1999). 
208.Id. 
209. Id. at 48-50. 
210.Id. 
211. Lisa A. Goodman et aI., Obstacles to Victims' Cooperation With the Criminal 
Prosecution of Their Abusers: The Role of Social Support, 14 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 427, 437 
(1999). In this study, victim cooperation was defined as providing necessary information to 
prosecutors and expressing a willingness to testify. Id. at 433. 
HeinOnline -- 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1891 2001-2002
2002] PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 1891 
networks often are methodically undermined during an abusive 
relationship.212 In a recent evaluation of law school domestic 
violence clinics, battered women reported that their student 
advocates actively worked on their behalf to repair such rela-
tionships as they talked to family and friends during pretrial 
investigation.213 The victims reported an increased sense of 
emotional support that was significantly greater than that among 
women who did not receive similar intensive advocacy services.214 
In addition, women in the advocacy group reported substantially 
lower levels of physical and psychological re-abuse, despite the fact 
that they had similar amounts of contact with their abusive 
partners during the study period.215 
These results indicate that in many cases, facilitating victim 
access to resources and support from family, friends, and trained 
personnel may more than compensate for any disempowerment 
caused by a move from mandatory to preferred arrest and pros-
ecution. In particular, advocacy services create similar benefits as 
do mandatory arrests: an increase in physical safety and the 
emotional space and empowerment necessary to engage in high-
quality decision making. 
An emphasis on advocacy has additional victim-centered 
procedural justice benefits. Research has shown that a woman who 
experiences government officials as listening to her story and 
responding to her individual needs is more likely to feel treated 
fairly, and therefore to cooperate with prosecutors' requests, than 
is a woman who feels forced into a mandatory model dismissive of 
her input.216 In contrast, limited communication opportunities lead 
victims to bypass the criminal justice system altogether. A study of 
victims who were re-assaulted in the aftermath of a prosecution 
found that sixty-seven percent of those victims who wished to speak 
212. Sullivan & Bybee, supra note 207, at 43-44. 
213. Margret E. Bell & Lisa A. Goodman, Supporting Battered Women Involved with the 
Court System: An Evaluation of a Law School-Based Advocacy Intervention, in VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN (forthcoming 2002) (on file with author) (study focused on advocacy work 
provided by the Georgetown University Law Center's Domestic Violence Clinic, which the 
author directs, and the Catholic University's Families and the Law Clinic). 
214.Id. 
215.Id. 
216. Erez & Belknap, supra note 161, at 264; Ford & Regoli, supra note 50, at 157-60. 
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to prosecutors about the original case but were unable to do so 
failed to report the subsequent assault.217 
To appropriately encourage victim participation in criminal 
litigation, prosecutors' offices should provide comprehensive 
advocacy services and referrals from the moment a case is filed, 
either within their own office or through referrals to private 
advocacy groupS.218 These services should include drug and alcohol 
counseling, psychological assistance, support groups, child care 
services, referrals to shelters, and economic assistance through 
state crime victims' compensation funds.219 Advocates also could 
convene a victim's friends and family members to assist in 
strengthening damaged relationships and weakened bonds of 
support. 
3. Expanding the Defense Attorney Role 
Defense attorneys play a critical role in the prOVlSIon of 
procedural justice. Increased opportunity to speak to an attorney 
improves defendant perceptions that the trial process is a fair 
one.220 These lawyers therefore are in a special position to assist in 
the effort to promote their clients' compliance with court orders. 
A defense attorney can promote procedural justice by spending 
sufficient time with a client to allow for a full articulation of his 
point of view, thus promoting his "voice"; by communicating respect 
for the client's dignity; and by providing a detailed overview, in 
advance, of the justice system process, promoting consistency. 
These ideas may sound like simply good lawyering, but many court-
217. Gerald T. Hotaling & Eve Buzawa, The Response to Victim Preferences by the 
Criminal Justice System and the Reporting of Re-victimization (July 25, 2001) (paper 
presented at the 7th International Family Violence Research Conference). 
218. Most of the research on the impact of advocacy services has focused on 
nongovernmental advocacy groups. It is unclear whether victim advocates, employed by the 
government and working in tandem with the prosecution, would be able to produce similar 
results. If not, prosecutors would have to form close relationships with, and assist with 
funding for, private providers of intensive advocacy services. 
219. Linda Mills has suggested some similar reforms in arguing that state actors should 
adopt a clinically based "survivor-centered model" of intervention that promotes a more 
respectful relationship with battered women. Mills, supra note 45, at 597·609. Mills also 
suggests important additional resources needed by victims who face particular religious, 
cultural, or other obstacles. Id. at 598·600. 
220. Casper et al., supra note 159, at 498. 
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appointed defense attorneys, who are paid too little and, 
accordingly, take on far too many cases, fail to make the time to do 
this work. 221 
Defense attorneys can protect their own clients' interests by 
increasing the chances that they will not run afoul of the law in the 
future. So although it must be tempting for defense counsel to share 
with clients their sense that the justice system is operating in an 
unfair manner, it is at least as important to let clients know when 
they believe a judge has acted fairly, a prosecutor is being 
reasonable, or a sentence is not overly harsh. Whether these 
moments are few or frequent, discussing them with a defendant 
could promote his future compliance with the court's directives and 
tht~s ultimately reduce the chances that he will recidivate and face 
additional criminal charges. 
Defense counsel can further assist their clients beyond the 
particular case at bar by taking on the role of advisor as well as 
defender. To fill this role, defense attorneys must educate them-
selves about the dynamics of intimate partner abuse, particularly 
findings that domestic violence typically increases in both severity 
and frequency over time.222 Defense attorneys' special position of 
trust allows them to effectively communicate this information to 
their clients, along with advice about preventive measures to help 
clients avoid reabuse and subsequent, more serious criminal 
charges. Defendants need to fully comprehend the advantages of 
complying with a civil protection order, as well as participating in 
counseling programs designed to deal with the violence, or with 
drug and alcohol abuse. Multidisciplinary public defender offices 
might be a valuable model for this approach.223 
221. David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1729 (1993); 
Ronald W. Schneider, Jr., A Measure of Our Justice System: A Look at Maine's Indigent 
Criminal Defense Delivery System, 48 ME. L. REv. 335 (1996); Jane Fritsch & David Rohde, 
Two-Tier Justice: Facing Life in Prison, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 8, 2001, at 1. 
222. See supra note 139. 
223. Attorneys at Neighborhood Defender of Harlem, for example, regularly refer 
defendant-clients to staff social workers who screen clients for social service needs by 
gathering information on the client's family background, substance abuse, and mental health 
history. Social workers write presentencing and prepleading reports for the clients. Social 
workers continue to follow up with clients post-adjudication. For example, a social worker 
would refer a domestic violence offender to a batterer treatment program, whether or not 
attendance is court ordered. Telephone Interview with Alexis Carrero, Staff Social Worker, 
Neighborhood Defender of Harlem (Aug. 3,2001). 
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Such conversations may be particularly difficult with batterer 
clients, because of their tendency to deny, minimize, and exter-
nalize blame for their actions.224 Specialized trajnjng from mental 
health professionals about how to engage in productive discussions 
about these issues might be useful. 
B. The Judiciary 
Procedural justice research leads to valuable lessons for judges 
in civil and criminal domestic violence cases. Issuance of civil 
protection orders or orders setting conditions of pretrial release or 
probation mean little if batterers view them as illegitimate and 
therefore feel free to ignore them. Judges who recognize and 
respond to defendants' normative concerns can exercise their 
authority more effectively; their rules and decisions are more likely 
to be voluntarily accepted' and inspire compliance. As a result, 
judicial trajning must be targeted toward promoting a sense offair 
process among defendants. 
Domestic violence training programs for judges focus almost 
exclusively on how to better understand and respond to victims; 
virtually no informatioI.1 is provided on how to better communicate 
neutrality and respect for defendants.225 Even discussions of how 
judges should respond to the special needs of pro se parties-an 
issue that is particularly significant in protection order cases-
typically is limited to ways in which the court can best assist 
unrepresented victims. 226 
This disparity in emphasis stems in large part from the fact that 
bias' against and mistreatment of victims, not batterers, is a far 
more serious and well-documented problem among members of the 
judiciary.227 This problem persists in the courts today.228 But to 
224. See infra text accompanying notes 258-60. 
225. E.g., THEFAMILYVIOLENCE PREvENTION FuND, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN Crvn. COURT 
CASES: A NATIONAL MODEL FOR JUDICIAL EDUCATION (Jacqueline Agtuca et al. eds., 1992). 
226. [d. at 149-52. The topic of "unrepresented parties" in this model curriculum includes 
thoughtful information about how court clerks can assist petitioners to fill out forms and 
accomplish service of process, and how judges can encourage local attorneys to represent 
victims. [d. The only mention of unrepresented respondents, however, is a paragraph 
asserting that generally they have no right to appointed counsel in protection order cases. 
[d. at 151. 
227. See supra text accompanying notes 69-79. Given that bias in favor of batterers has 
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maximize victim safety through batterer compliance with no-
contact and no-assault directives, with custody and visitation 
awards, with counseling requirements, and with other conditions 
of release, judges also must be trained to promote perceptions of 
procedural justice among accused perpetrators. . 
One way that judges can accomplish this goal is to take the time 
to describe the trial process, as well as the applicable substantive 
law, at the outset of a hearing. As discussed infra, increased 
information can be important to a litigant's sense of fairness.229 
Concerns for judicial economy and the overwhelming number of 
cases on most protection order and criminal misdemeanor calendars 
may dictate that such information cannot be provided in every 
individual case. Instead, a judge may choose to begin each court 
session with a general description of case procedures, addressed to 
all of the litigants assigned to trial that day . 
. Judges also must provide sufficient time for each defendant to 
tell his story. Providing perpetrators with a sense of voice can have 
a profound impact on compliance.230 As with police officers, judges 
must learn to communicate a willingness to understand and an 
openness to considering a defendant's version of the case. As 
discussed supra, this requires a demonstration that the judge is 
present in the moment and is attending to the defendant without 
distraction.231 This may be particularly challenging in civil 
protection order cases involving unrepresented parties. Pro se 
litigants often have trouble remaining focused on legally relevant 
details; this can be quite frustrating for a judge with a crowded 
docket. Clear instructions from the court, however, about the kinds 
of facts that may be presented, communicated with patience and 
sensitivity, can help to alleviate this problem. Finally, by clearly 
long been the norm, this may be a relatively limited problem. My own observations indicate 
that the issue arises primarily among judges who generally treat pro se litigants in a 
disrespectful manner. Another potential source is welI.meaningjudges who have undergone 
extensive domestic violence training, taken the lessons to heart, and are now working hard 
to increase victims' sense of comfort in the courtroom. Occasionally, one of these judges bends 
over backwards to encourage victims to feel comfortable and, in so doing, creates an 
atmosphere of unfair disparity. 
228. See supra note 131. 
229. See infra text accompanying notes 237-44. 
230. See supra text accompanying notes 146-48. 
231. See supra text accompanying notes 187-88. 
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communicating the court's rulings and the findings that support 
them, a judge may improve the sense of dignity and respect that 
defendants take away from the courthouse. 
Another procedural justice problem area for judges is the trend 
to rely on "dangerousness assessments" to determine an ap-
propriate sentence or to set the terms of civil protection orders.232 
These research tools were developed to assist victims in predicting 
the likelihood that the violence in a relationship will recur and 
escalate. Victims whose intimate partners have a high danger-
ousness score are encouraged to engage in particularly extensive 
safety planning.233 
Over the past ten years, however, courts across the country have 
begun to use these instruments to increase terms of imprisonment, 
deny probation and parole, and require supervision of visitation 
sessions with children.234 Defense attorneys and others have raised 
significant concerns with this practice. Most troubling is the fact 
that no empirical data currently are available to demonstrate the 
predictive validity of dangerousness assessments.235 In addition, the 
instruments typically are administered by untrained personnel on 
faulty and incomplete sources of information.236 Judicial decision 
making on the basis of such a problematic information source is 
likely to create a perception among defendants that they have not 
been provided consistent treatment in the justice system-a 
fundamental component of procedural justice. Judges must refrain 
from utilizing these instruments for purposes other than victim 
safety planning. 
232. STATE JUSTICE lNST., CURRENT USE OF DANGEROUSNESS AsSESSMENTS IN SENTENCING 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OFFENDERS: FINAL REPORT 12 (Jan Roehl & Kristin Guertin eds., 1998). 
Dangerousness assessments are also used, with similarly problematic results, by prosecutors 
making charging decisions. [d. 
233. [d. at 1. 
234. [d. 
235. Id. at 14. 
236. [d. 
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C. The Civil Justice System 
1. Expanding the Information Provided to Perpetrators 
Batterer education could help increase compliance with civil 
protection orders. The vast majority of accused abusers in these 
cases are not represented by counsel237 and they have little or no 
access to advocacy services. Courthouse personnel typically will not 
answer their questions on the grounds that they are prohibited 
from giving legal advice. Further, although "know your rights" 
guides, informational videos, and community education workshops 
targeted at assisting victims have proliferated across the country, 
few if any exist for the perpetrator community. 
Many unrepresented parties do not comprehend the way the legal 
system operates, the roles of various system players, or the nature 
of their own obligations.238 Defendants in civil protection order 
cases who have any background understanding of the justice 
system typically have experience only with criminal procedure; 
very few have even a vague sense of what to expect in a civil 
case. Like victims, they "don't differentiate at all-or if they do, 
they differentiate incorrectly-between the civil and criminal 
systems."239 On the morning of a civil protection order trial, most 
respondents expect to receive appointed counsel; they are concerned 
that a protection order will add to their criminal record; and some 
mistakenly believe that the judge may incarcerate them if an order 
is issued.240 Moreover, they rarely understand in advance that the 
court appearance to which they have been summoned will be a trial, 
so they typically are unprepared and lack witnesses or other forms 
of supporting evidence. 
237. See supra note 134. 
238. Engler, supra note 134, at 103-04, 112, 127-28. As one example, Professor Engler 
recounts a story about an unrepresented defendant in an eviction action who concluded a 
discussion with the landlord's lawyer by saying, "Thank you, Your Honor." [d. at 110. 
239. Ph.D. candidate, Lauren Bennett, Remarks to District of Columbia U.S. Attorney's 
Office, Domestic Violence Training (Dec. 12, 1996) (transcript on file with author). 
240. This observation, and the others in this paragraph, are based on my experience in 
negotiating protection orders in hundreds of civil protection order cases and several years 
of directing D.C.'s Emergency Domestic Relations Project, which until November 1996 was 
responsible for handling all pretrial protection order cases for pro se victims in the District 
of Columbia. 
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This dearth of information affects several procedural justice 
factors. First, it is difficult to believe that one is receiving consistent 
treatment from the court without understanding what to expect or 
how the system functions. A defendant who confuses civil and 
criminal procedure is particularly likely to feel that he is the victim 
of inconsistent treatment when he learns that he has no right to 
appointed counsel and the standard of proof is far lower than 
beyond a reasonable doubt. To correct these problems, defendants 
must be informed about the appropriate legal basis of a claim, 
applicable legal defenses, available relief, pretrial settlement 
negotiation options (and their advisability), the kinds of witnesses 
and other sources of evidence that would be useful to present at 
trial, and referral sources for low-cost or free legal advice.241 
Second, if speaking to an attorney gives a litigant an increased 
sense of "voice,,,242 then so might the receipt of other, less resource-
intensive forms of information and legal advice, such as lay 
advocacy, educational pamphlets, and community education 
workshops.243 Third, in jurisdictions where victims have access to 
some (even if limited) lay advocacy services,244 perpetrators might 
perceive the existence of analogous, defense-oriented assistance as 
evidence of the court's neutrality as well as the justice system's 
respect for the accused. Finally, better-informed defendants might 
find it easier to maintain a sense of dignity and fairness as they 
navigate the civil protection order process. 
Providing more information to respondents could be done in a 
fairly simple, low-cost manner. When the court provides a copy of 
the civil protection order complaint for service of process, clerks 
could attach a form containing essential information and referrals. 
241. These topics frequently are among those included in victim advocacy guides. See, e.g., 
KNOw YOUR RrGHTS: A GUIDE TO LEGAL REMEDIES FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE DISTRICT 
OF COLUMBIA (Deborah Epstein ed., 2001). 
242. See supra text accompanying notes 146-48. 
243. Of course, the best way to educate and inform respondents about the civil protection 
order system is to ensure that they are all represented by counsel. A system in which both 
victims and respondents have access to attorneys would constitute an enormous 
improvement over the current, predominantly pro se procedure. But given the enormous 
costs of such a solution, it is unlikely that this will occur in the near future. 
244. Such assistance for victims is still far too limited and under-funded. The majority of 
domestic violence service providers nationwide report that victim demand far exceeds the 
number of advocates. Kinports & Fischer, supra note 75, at 173. Still, a greater number of 
victims than respondents have access to such services. [d. 
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Receiving such information directly from the court may be 
particularly beneficial in improving defendants' impressions of the 
court's neutrality in these cases. More in-depth information guides 
about how to put on a defense in a protection order case should be 
drafted and widely distributed, as have analogous materials geared 
toward the legal rights of battered women. Defense attorneys could 
accept pro bono referrals for particularly complex cases, train lay 
advocates to staff a telephone information line to answer questions, 
or accompany defendants to court. 
Of course, a-better-informed respondent community may mean 
an increase in the percentage of contested protection order cases, 
making this emergency process a greater ordeal for some battered 
women. But if perpetrators will be more likely to abide by these 
orders, the victim community will be far better off. 
2. Expanding the Pretrial Negotiation Process 
In most jurisdictions, parties in civil protection order cases 
have the opportunity to participate in settlement negotiations 
immediately prior to trial.245 Designed primarily to alleviate the 
court's trial docket, this process tends to be conducted under tight 
time restrictions and with institutional pressure on negotiators to 
produce the maximum possible number of settled cases.246 The 
overwhelming majority of participants are pro se, and lay advocates 
are rarely, if ever, available.247 
These limitations minimize the procedural justice benefits of a 
negotiation. Alternative dispute resolution research shows that 
perceptions offairtreatment are linked to a participant's belief that 
he was given an opportunity to state his case, the full spectrum of 
relevant issues was aired, and the officiant listened to and made 
genuine efforts to understand the concerns raised.248 In a rushed, 
understaffed249 procedure that occurs just moments or hours before 
245. Telephone Interview with Juley Fulcher, Public Policy Director, National Coalition 
Against Domestic Violence (July 23, 2001). 
246. Gladys Kessler & Linda J. Finkelstein, The Evolution of a Multi-Door Courthouse, 
37 CATH. U. L. REv. 577, 578-80 (1988). 
247. Epstein, supra note 2, at 25-26. 
248. See supra text accompanying notes 157-59. 
249. In the District of Columbia, for example, two court negotiators attempt to resolve an 
average of thirty cases per day. Telephone Interview with Paul Roddy, Director, Domestic 
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trial, there is little chance that these goals will be accomplished. If 
spending additional time allowing defendants to air their views and 
responding to their concerns would improve future compliance, the 
court should provide the resources needed to support such program. 
expansion.250 , 
The negotiation process could be further improved from a 
procedural justice vantage point through the participation of 
trained advocates who could offer litigants strategic advice and 
emotional support. An expansion of the current, inadequate 
advocacy pool251 would be valuable for both sides. For defendants, 
it would increase the opportunity to feel heard, understood, and 
respected. For victims, it would reduce the power disparity that 
makes it so difficult to remain firm in their bargaining positions.252 
V. CAUTIONARY NOTES 
Refocusing the battered women's movement strategy to 
incorporate notions of procedural justice appears to be a promising 
avenue for increasing victim safety. But two special issues must be 
carefully considered before generalizing from the existing literature 
to the family abuse context. 
Violence Unit, D.C. Superior Court (July 24, 2001). 
250. Negotiators in domestic violence cases must be careful to avoid shifting into a 
mediation paradigm, which experts agree is inappropriate in intimate abuse cases. E.g., 
Karla Fischer et al., The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation in Domestic Violence 
Cases, 46 SMU L. REV. 2117 (1993). It is too dangerous to assume a level playing field and 
roughly equal power balance between two parties when one has been the victim of violence 
or threats perpetrated by the other. Id. at 2161-62. To avoid this problem, court-sponsored 
civil protection order negotiations typically are conducted in relay fashion, with the primary 
focus on the relief available to the petitioner at trial and whether the two parties can agree 
to her requests. See id. at 2168-69. For an excellent discussion of this issue see Trina Grillo, 
The Mediation Alternative: Process Damages for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991). 
251. Kinports & Fischer, supra note 75, at 173 (noting that the majority of domestic 
violence service providers nationwide report that victim demand for advocates far exceeds 
their availability). 
252. Given the current dearth of victim advocates, any expansion would have to occur on 
behalf of both parties. An increase in advocacy for perpetrators alone would further tip the 
power imbalance between abuser and victim and greatly harm victim access to justice and 
safety. 
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A. Special Characteristics of the Batterer Population: The 
Potential Effect on Procedural Justice 
1901 
Because most existingproceduraljustice data have been collected 
outside of the domestic violence context, a question must be raised: 
Can we generalize from these studies to predict the future 
compliance of those who abuse their intimate partners? Batterers 
may differ from other groups examined in the procedural justice 
literature, which includes misdemeanants, traffic offenders, and 
participants in custody disputes, in myriad ways. They may have 
different expectations about case procedures and outcomes, 
especially given the justice system's long record of failing to hold 
abusers accountable253 and the defense bar's perceptions that the 
newly reformed system is fundamentally biased against their 
clients.254 They may have different levels of attachment to the 
governmental system of which police, prosecutors, and judges are 
a part, arising out of their own childhood experiences, either of 
being victimized themselves by an adult family member,255 or of 
watching one parent abused by the other with no effective official 
intervention.256 Finally, they may have different values, such as 
disproportionately favoring the use of aggression in marriage.257 
Each of these potential variances could affect the way in which 
253. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21, 50-53. 
254. See supra text accompanying note 124. 
255. Although the relationship between experiences of maltreatment as a child and adult 
domestic violence is relatively unexplored, the data suggest that children who experience 
maltreatment have an increased risk of committing a violent crime. Cathy Spatz Widom, 
Child Abuse and Alcolwl Use and Abuse, in ALcoHOL AND INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE: 
FOSTERING MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 291 (S.E. Martin ed., 1992). 
256. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21, 50-53 for a brief history of the state's 
failure to respond to domestic violence situations. 
257. Studies have found that batterers are more likely to articulate favorable views of 
aggression in marriage. Although some data indicate that men who feel strongly about 
traditional sex role stereotypes have higher levels of marital aggression, other data do not. 
Compare Donald G. Saunders et aI., The Inventory of Beliefs about Wife Beating: The 
Construction and Initial Validation of a Measure of Beliefs and Attitudes, 2 VIOLENCE & 
VICTIMS 39 (1987) (concluding that negative attitudes toward battered women are linked 
with traditional views of women's roles), with Peter H. Neidig et aI., Attitudinal 
Characteristics of Males Who Have Engaged in Spouse Abuse, 1 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 223 (1986) 
(concluding that abusive males are not more likely to hold traditional views of women's 
roles). 
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perpetrators evaluate their contacts with justice system officials 
and, in turn, their future compliance. 
A growing literature on the cognitive psychological processes of 
batterers further supports the need to proceed with caution here. 
For example, in a recent series of studies, cognitive psychologists 
examined whether deficits in information processing cause 
batterers to misconstrue social stimuli.258 The data indicate that 
violent male spouses are more likely than others259 to offer 
external, shifting attributions for their behavior. Rather than 
accepting responsibility themselves, batterers tend to minjmjze, 
deny, rationalize, or blame the victim for their violence. 260 Batterers 
also are more likely to have unrealistic expectations and irrational 
beliefs that increase the likelihood of marital anger and aggression. 
For example, they tend to think in rigid, dichotomous categories 
of acceptable and unacceptable behavior; articulate absolutist 
demands that others act "appropriately"; magnify the importance 
of negative situations; and make arbitrary inferences in the absence 
of confirming evidence.261 
Because cognitive psychologists believe that such emotionally 
influenced thought distortions are instinctual, they may occur 
across a wide variety of provocative situations,262 including arrests 
and courtroom proceedings. If maritally violent men actively 
misconstrue or otherwise distort situations in ways that cause them 
258. Amy Holtzworth-Munroe, Social Skill Deficits in Maritally Violent Men: Interpreting 
the Data Using a Social Information Processing Model, 12 CLINICAL PSYCH. REv. 605, 607 
(1992). 
259. Several of these studies compared abusers to two different control groups: maritally 
distressed, nonviolent men and maritally satisfied, nonviolent men. E.g., id. 
260. DANIEL J. SONKlN ET AL., THE MALE BATI'ERER: A TREATMENT APPROACH 42 (1985); 
LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATl'ERED WOMAN SYNDROME 96-98 (1984) (finding that forty-two 
to sixtY-nine percent of women report that their partners justified, rationalized, explained, 
or apologized after violent incident; percentages decreased with length of abusive behavior); 
Christopher I. EckhardtetaI., Articulated Thoughts of Maritally ViolentandNonvialentMen 
During Anger Arousal, 66 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCH. 259 (1998); Nancy M. Shields 
& Christine R. Hanneke, Attrwutian Processes in Violent Relationships: Perceptions of 
Violent Husbands and Their Wives, 13 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 515 (1983) (violent husbands 
were less likely than their wives to see their violence as attributable to themselves). Abusers' 
tendency to excuse behavior appears to apply equally to both violent and nonviolent 
behavior. Amy Holtzworth-Munroe et aL, Vialent Married Couples' Attributions for Vialent 
and Nonuialent Self and Partner Behaviors, in BEHA VlORAL AsSESSMENT 53, 59 (1992). 
261. Holtzworth-Munroe, supra note 258, at 605. 
262. Eckhardt et aI., supra note 260, at 260, 266. 
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to experience a higher frequency of anger arousal and threat 
provocation,263 their perceptions regarding the provisions of 
procedural justice may be different than those of the population 
groups studied in the existing literature.264 
It is also possible that batterers' cognitive distortions, when 
applied to the legal system, are exacerbated by interactions with 
defense counsel. Predictably, attorneys representing accused 
perpetrators in criminal and civil protection order cases have 
opposed reforms designed to improve the system's response to 
battered women.265 Perpetrators' tendencies to attribute respon-
sibility externally, make arbitrary inferences, and exaggerate 
negativity may be encouraged when their attorneys-correctly or 
incorrectly-articulate the position that the court system is biased 
and unfair. 
The recent domestic violence arrest reevaluation study forms a 
solid basis for concluding that procedural justice does affect 
batterer compliance. But future research efforts should focus 
further on this particular population group to identify potential 
applicability hurdles from general population studies. 
B. The Victim's Perspective: A Potential Determinant of the 
Impact of Procedural Justice 
Accurate analysis of procedural justice effects on abusive 
intimate partners must entail consideration of the perspective and 
role of the victim. Unlike research focusing on stranger, or 
"victimless" crimes, any study of batterer compliance may be 
confounded by variables in victim behavior.266 When an arrest 
263. [d. at 266. 
264. This theory is bolstered somewhat by a study oflong-term compliance with mediated 
divorce agreements, in which researchers found that escalation of a dispute prior to 
mediation was inversely related to long-term compliance. Pruitt et al., supra note 170, at 
322. Prior escalation was measured on the basis of two factors: an observer's rating of the 
worst incident mentioned during mediation and the participants' self-assessments of their 
hostility levels at the outset of mediation. [d. at 320. But see Harrell & Smith, supra note 
130, at 50 (finding that severity of most recent incident of physical violence prior to victim's 
filing for civil protection order did not predict the batterer's failure to comply). 
265. See supra text accompanying note 124. 
266. Professor Cynthia Grant Bowman has criticized the domestic violence arrest 
experiments of the late 1980s on similar grounds. Cynthia Grant Bowman, The Arrest 
Experiments: A Feminist Critique, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 201, 204 (1992). 
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occurs in which the police use derogatory language and embarrass 
the accused in front of friends and neighbors, the victim might 
experience a sense of shame within her community for failing to 
keep her marriage strong or be accused of "causing" another 
member of a minority group to enter the criminal justice system.267 
Or it might be that police officers who subject a suspect to unfair 
and disrespectful treatment also are responding similarly to the 
victim. Either scenario could decrease the victim's incentive to 
report subsequent abuse, thus artificially lowering the reported 
recidivism rate. The police behavior described above also could 
push the victim to remain with her abusive partner; this proximity 
alone could result in a higher rate of future noncompliance.26B 
Data documenting recidivism therefore could reflect the victim's 
alienation from, or satisfaction with, the procedural fairness of the 
justice system, rather than, or in addition to, any impact on the 
perpetrator. Future studies must take the victim's crucial role into 
account so that it is possible to determine whether efforts to 
improve procedural justice for perpetrators can be implemented in 
tandem with efforts to promote victim empowerment and safety. 
Such studies could shed important additional light on the factors 
affecting batterer compliance.269 
CONCLUSION 
The legal achievements of the) battered women's movement-
including mandatory arrest, no-drop prosecution, and the Model 
Code on Domestic and Family Violence-have dramatically 
267. Epstein, supra note 2, at 17-18. 
268. David A. Ford & Mary Jean Regoli, The Preventive Impacts of Policies for Prosecuting 
Wife Batterers, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 52, at 181, 200, 202-03 (finding that 
during the six months following criminal charges, women who continued to live with their 
abusive partners for any period of time were more likely to be battered anew). 
269. Similarly, one must consider whether the victim was living with the perpetrator at 
the outset of the justice system intervention and, if so, whether she managed to find 
alternative, safe housing before he returned. Professor Bowman raises this point in the 
context of a critique of the mandatory arrest studies. Bowman, supra note 266, at 205. If a 
victim is able to escape to a safe and secret location, recidivism is less likely than if she 
remains trapped in a shared residence with her abusive partner. This factor is complicated 
by evidence that when a battered woman attempts to leave the relationship, she is at 
greatest risk of serious reabuse or homicide, a concept that Martha Mahoney has termed 
"separation assault." Mahoney, supra note 64, at 64-79. 
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improved victims' access to justice and the likelihood that perpe-
trators will be held accountable. At the same time, however, each 
of these reforms has contributed to a substantial reduction in the 
procedural justice accorded to batterers. 
Proceduraljustice demands that a defendant feel that he has an 
opportunity to voice his side of the story, perceive that the relevant 
authorities are neutral and unbiased, believe that the legal system 
is consistent in its treatment of individuals and cases, and see that 
officials are treating him with dignity and respect. Social science 
studies show that these factors have a significant, independent 
effect on the likelihood that an individual will comply with an 
official directive. If a person feels fairly treated by state officials, he 
will perceive them as more legitimate and, as a consequence, will 
be more likely to obey their orders. This is true regardless of 
whether he perceives an order to be right or wrong, and even if 
compliance is counter to his immediate self-interest. 
The procedural justice data indicate the existence of a close 
connection between batterers' sense of fair treatment and victim 
safety. If government power is exercised in a way that instills a 
sense of procedural unfairness, it undermines the likelihood of 
perpetrator compliance, putting victims of abuse at risk. 
This conclusion necessitates a reassessment of current domestic 
violence policies. The civil and criminal justice systems must better 
communicate fundamental fairness and respect to batterers without 
losing the enormous gains for victims that the past thirty years 
have witnessed. Police officers are finally beginning to arrest 
batterers, prosecutors are finally following through with criminal 
cases, and judges are slowly becoming sensitized to the special 
dynamics of intimate partner abuse. But now it is time to address 
perpetrators' prevalent perceptions that "the system is against 
them." This Article seeks to begin a dialogue about how to strike 
this new balance: supporting battered women and encouraging 
them in their efforts to obtain safety, while simultaneously 
enhancing abusers' perceptions that justice system authorities are 
sufficiently moral and legitimate to inspire compliance. 
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